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Comment

Crack, Congress, and the Normalization of
Federal Sentencing: Why 12,040 Federal
Inmates Believe That Their Sentences
Should Be Reduced, and Why They and
Others Like Them May Be Right

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s was a transitionary period in American history, when the
general acceptance of casual drug use, which is still associated with the
1960s and 1970s, began to turn to widespread disapproval.' The
practice and dangers of "freebasing"-smoking cocaine that had been
purified with ether and inhaled over an open flame-came into the public
spotlight in 1980 when a prominent comedian immolated himself in an
accident blamed on the dangerous practice.2 Beginning in 1984, a
cheaper, more accessible form of freebase cocaine, called "crack," began

1. Robert Reinhold, Leveling Off ofDrug Use FoundAmong Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1981, at Al.
2. Richard Pryor's Tragic Accident Spotlights a Dangerous Drug Craze: Freebasing,
PEOPLE, June 30, 1980, at 69, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article
/0,,20076864,00.html [hereinafter Freebasing].
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growing in popularity in New York, Miami, and Los Angeles. 3 In
November 1985, newspapers began running articles that raised public
alarm over this new, cheap, and powerful form of cocaine.' By mid1986, the term "crack epidemic" had come into widespread use as a way
to describe this new drug's booming popularity.s
In response to the rising numbers of crack users across the nation,
Congress took swift and decisive action by passing the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986.6 This law rewrote federal drug regulations that had been
in place since 1970 and added, for the first time, sentences for possession
of controlled substances that varied based on both the substance and the
quantity possessed. The passage of the Act had been preceded by
almost a year of regular congressional hearings on the dangerousness of
crack cocaine, with the conversations escalating in both alarm and
urgency.' As a result of these hearings, the quantity of crack that a
defendant was required to have in order to trigger a mandatory
minimum sentence of 5 or 10 years' imprisonment was set at 1% of the
quantity of cocaine required to trigger the same sentence. 9
While fiercely fighting the "crack epidemic," Congress was also
creating a new federal agency, the United States Sentencing Commission, to promote uniformity and predictability in federal criminal
sentencing."o The Commission's first set of regulations took effect in
1987, and the sentencing guidelines therein were made compulsory on
the judges applying them.n This included the heightened statutory
minimum sentences required by Congress's 1986 Anti-Drug legislation." It was not long, however, before patterns began emerging. By
the mid-1990s, it became apparent that African-Americans were

3. See, e.g., Ray Huard, Cocaine a Cheap High, Hotline Finding,MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
21, 1985, at 1.
4. See id.
5. See Kevin Cullen, New "Crack"Druga Major Challenge,Officials Say, BOS. GLOBE,
May 1, 1986, at 29.
6. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
7. See Controlled Substances Import and Export Penalities Enhancement Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-15 (this Act embodies "Subtitle G" of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986).
8. See, e.g., Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws-The Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 170-72 (2007) (statement of Eric E. Sterling, Former Assistant Counsel, House
Subcommittees on Crime and Criminal Justice, 1979-1989) (describing how the drafters of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 arrived at a 100:1 sentencing ratio).
9. Id.
10. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
12.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

2D1.1 (1987) (amended 2011).
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subjected to a disproportionate number of federal crack convictions,
along with their drastically heightened penalties.a Meanwhile, those
being convicted for possession of drugs without heightened penalties,
such as powdered cocaine, were disproportionately white."
These two new legal systems continued to operate side-by-side until
2005, with federal judges in the position of being compelled to sentence
members of the overrepresented African-American community more
harshly for drug crimes." Then, in 2005, the United States Supreme
Court held in United States v. Booker1 that the statutes that made the
United States Sentencing Guidelines compulsory on federal judges were
unconstitutional, and reinterpreted the guidelines as being merely
advisory. 7
Since then, the call to end the disparity between crack and cocaine
sentencing has drawn a great deal of support,'" and eventually
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.1' This Act has
reduced the 100:1 ratio used in crack and cocaine sentencing to one that
treats the possession of crack somewhat more leniently.20 Furthermore,
because the United States Sentencing Commission has modified the
United States Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the Fair
Sentencing Act,2 ' and has chosen to make those modifications retroactively applicable to people serving sentences for crack convictions that
predate the Act,2 2 this area of law is likely to be the subject of a large
amount of litigation in the coming years-particularly as prisoners
continue to struggle to receive the sentencing reductions to which they

13. See Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Why Did Racial/Ethnic
Sentencing Differences in Federal District Courts Grow Larger Under the Guidelines?, 6
FED. SENT'G REP. 223, 224-26 (1994).

14. Id.
15. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005).
16. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
17. See id. at 244-45.
18.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL, app. C, vol. III, amend. 706 (2011).

19. Pub. L. No. 111-220 § 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified in scatted sections of 21
U.S.C. ch. 13).
20. Compare id. § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372, with Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1002, 100
Stat. at 3207-2 to -4.
21.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2011),

availableathttp://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/OfficialText/20110428-Amendments
.pdf.
22. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes
Unanimously To Apply Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Amendment to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Retroactively (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
andPublicAffairs/Newsroom/PressReleases/20110630Press Release.pdf.
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are entitled." This Comment explores the issues and outcomes of those
cases, including current circuit splits in the area, as well as the
possibility for future litigation in the United States Supreme Court and
other possible directions for this rapidly-evolving area of federal criminal
law.
II.

A.

HISTORY OF THE ISSUE

Cocaine and Cocaine Base

Cocaine is a powerful stimulant drug that is derived from the leaves
of coca plants.' It came into popular use as an anesthetic near the end
of the nineteenth century, but today it is widely understood to be a
dangerous and highly addictive drug.2 5 Cocaine is classified as a
Schedule II drug under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)," which
means that it "has a high potential for abuse[,] . . . [it] has a currently

accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently
accepted medical use with severe restrictions[,] ... [and a]buse of the
drug. . . may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence."
Cocaine is widely available as a fine, white powder.' This form is
also known as cocaine hydrochloride (cocaine HC1)." Cocaine HCl is
a salt form of cocaine that readily dissolves in water.o However, this
salt form has a higher melting temperature than cocaine base, the
chemically pure form of cocaine, which causes cocaine HCl to burn and
lose its psychoactive properties at lower temperatures than those
required to vaporize it for smoking or inhalation." In the 1970s,
cocaine users started applying chemical processes to cocaine HCI to
remove the hydrochloride component of the molecule and crystallize the

23. See generally Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010); United States v. Ware,
No. 08-625-01, 2012 WL 38937 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2012).
24. Powdered Cocaine FastFacts: Questionsand Answers, NA'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE
CENTER (U.S. Dep't of Justice), Apr. 2003, available at http://www.justice.gov/ndicipubs3/
3951/3951p.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-904 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2) (2006).
28. Powdered Cocaine Fast Facts, supra note 24.
29. Id.
30. Special Report, The CIA-Contra-CrackCocaine Controversy:A Review of the Justice
Department's Investigationsand Prosecutions,OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (U.S. Dep't of
Justice), Dec. 1997, at app. B, available at http://wwwjustice.gov/oig/special/9712/index
.htm.
31. Id. at app. B, n.1.
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purified cocaine base." This purified form, called "freebase," sublimates, or vaporizes, at a much lower temperature than cocaine HC1, and
can be directly inhaled without losing its stimulant characteristics."
Using freebase, "freebasing,"' has a more immediate, more intense
effect on the user than powdered cocaine, though the effects fade more
quickly than those of powdered cocaine."
Before the popularization of crack cocaine, creating freebase involved
using highly flammable ether to separate the drug base from chemical
solvents that trapped the hydrochloride component of cocaine HC1.
This dangerous practice came to national attention in 1980 when
comedian Richard Pryor was badly burned over a large portion of his
body in an accident that the Los Angeles Police Department attributed
to freebasing.x Despite the danger and complexity of the freebasing
process, a 1983 survey of callers to the national cocaine hotline revealed
that 21% of those surveyed indicated that freebasing was their choice
method for ingesting cocaine. In addition, 40% of cocaine users were
earning more than $25,000 per year, 9 and the average user spent $637
a week on 6.5 grams of cocaine (at $98 per gram).40
In the mid-1980s, this began to change. A follow-up survey by the
national cocaine hotline, conducted in early 1985, found that demographBy that time, only 27% of users were
ics were shifting rapidly."
earning more than $25,000 per year,42 the average user was spending
$535 per week on 7.2 grams of cocaine (at about $74 per gram), and the
proportion of those who preferred to insufflate (snort) cocaine HCl fell,
while the proportion of users who preferred freebasing climbed to

32.

Id. at app. B.

33. Id.
34. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, What's up with Cocaine?,in GET IT STRAIGHT! (1996),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20101129180552/http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/
straight/cocaine.htm.
35. DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225, 2228-29 (2011).
36. Id. at 2228; see also Jeff Leen, FreebasingCauses Euphoric 'Explosion,' MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 30, 1985, at 3B.

37.

Freebasing,supra note 2.

38. Herb Roehrich & Mark S. Gold, 800-COCAINE: Origin,Significance,and Findings,
61 YALE J. Bio. & MED. 149, 151 tbl. 2 (1988).
39. This would be roughly equivalent to earning more than $56,893.83 per year in 2012
dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator,U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, http://www.bls.gov/
data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
40. Roehrich & Gold, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. This would be roughly equivalent to earning more than $52,663.80 per year in 2012

dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator,supra note 39.
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30%.4 Survey analysts interpreted this shift as signaling the end of
cocaine as a drug for the wealthy.44 The press blamed this change on
crack cocaine." By November 1985, stories about the spread of this
cheaper form of freebase cocaine began circulating in American
newspapers.
Crack was a newly-popularized way of isolating cocaine base by
combining cocaine HCl in water with another pH-basic chemical, usually
baking soda, and boiling the mixture down into a solid state to cause the
hydrochloride to bond chemically with the added base instead of the
cocaine base."1 From this solid state, the concoction could be chipped
apart into "rocks" resembling small pieces of soap, which sold for about
$10 per pea-sized dose." The end product was a cheaper form of
smokable freebase cocaine that was easier and safer to make-the sound
of which gave crack its onomatopoetic name"-with the same potent
and immediate effects that required dangerous ether-based purification
methods only years earlier.o The profound, immediate, and brief high
that crack users experienced would be followed by a strong desire to
smoke more and return to the same high state." As a result, crack
users could become deeply addicted in a matter of weeks, whereas
powdered cocaine users normally required years of use before addiction."'
From inner-city New York, Miami, and Los Angeles, crack began to
spread to the rest of the country over the next few years.53 By the end
of 1986, crack use, sales, and trafficking had reached rural areas in the

43. Roehrich & Gold, supra note 38.
44. Id. at 150; see also Huard, supra note 3.
45. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Extra-Potent Cocaine: Use Rising SharplyAmong Teen-agers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1986, at Bl.

46. See generally Huard, supra note 3; Jane Gross, A New, Purified Form of Cocaine
Causes Alarm as Abuse Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at Al; Associated Press,
'Crack'Found Luring Young Drug Users, PHILA. DAILY NEws, Dec. 6, 1985, at 10.

47. Crack Cocaine Fact Facts: Questions and Answers, NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE
CENTER (U.S. Dep't of Justice), Apr. 2003, available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs3/
3978/3978p.pdf.

48. Al Truesdell, Crack Ruins Some, Scares Many-CocaineDerivative CreatesAddicts
in All Economic Levels of County, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 27, 1986, at 1.

49. Ellis E. Conklin, Crack: The Most Addictive Substance on This Planet-1 1/2 Million
Are Hooked, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 1986, at 43.
50. Truesdell, supra at note 48.
51. Kerr, supra at note 45.

52. Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After Years, It Erupted, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1986, at Al.

53. William E. Schmidt, Police Say Use of Crack Is Moving to Small Towns and Rural
Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1986, at Al.
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western and southeastern United States, as well as parts of New
England." As crack spread, an increase in "robberies and violent
By 1987, gangs had developed organized crack
crime" followed."
distribution networks, and in some parts of the country, wars broke out
between rival groups vying for control of contested territory wherever
crack could be sold.56
One popular tactic for female addicts was to resort to prostitution as
a means of feeding their crack dependencies." This practice led to
dramatic increases in some areas in the numbers of reported cases of
HIV, syphilis, and drug-resistant strains of gonorrhea." News outlets
also told of overwhelming numbers of "crack babies" born to mothers
addicted to the drug. 9 These babies exhibited signs of drug withdrawal through their first few weeks of life, "including irritability, tremors,
muscle rigidity and stiffness."60 In one particularly horrifying case in
Detroit, a three-month-old infant died of a drug overdose after nursing
from its mother a few days after she had taken crack." In the child's
short life, she had already developed scars from where her mother had
neglected her diaper rash, and she had been "racked by seizures and
62
scorched by fever-symptoms common to cocaine-related deaths."
B. The United States Sentencing Commission
The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), which is comprised
of eight members, including three federal judges,63 was created on

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Peter Kerr, A Crack Plague in Queens Brings Violence and Fear,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1987, at Al; see also William Overendt, Crips and Bloods L.A. Gangs: Are They
Migrating?,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at 1.
57. Al Truesdell, Sexual Disease SpreadingPublic Health Officials Blame Prostitutes
Trading Sex for Crack Cocaine, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 1987, at 1.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Peter Kerr, Babies of Crack Users Fill Hospital Nurseries,N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1986, at B.
60. Id. In recent years, studies following babies suffering from prenatal cocaine
exposure have strongly undermined the fears of the 1980s that crack "would produce a
generation of severely damaged children." Susan Okie, The Epidemic that Wasn't, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at DL. While studies have found "reliable and persistent" differences
between cocaine-exposed children and other children, "the long-term effects of such
exposure on children's brain development and behavior appear relatively small." Id.
61. Stephen Franklin, Detroit Wages All-Out War Against Crack, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec.
13, 1987, at 29.
62. Id.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
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October 12, 1984, by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984" for the
purpose of "establishling] sentencing policies and practices for the
Federal criminal justice system" and "develop[ing] means of measuring
the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are
effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing."' This was seen as
necessary in order to
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct
while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices;
and. . . [to] reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 6
As originally created, the USSC's twenty-three specifically enumerated
duties centered around promulgating regulations for sentencing courts
to use as a guide for calculating the form, degree, and conditions
attached to sentences, based on factors such as the nature of the crimes
of conviction, criminal history, and aggravating and mitigating
factors."
The product of the USSC's rulemaking effort was called the Guidelines
Manual (USSG)." After receiving congressional approval, the USSG
were first published in 1987." The USSG effectively boiled down the
entire range of federal criminal behavior onto a single-page "sentencing
table."o All crimes could be sentenced under the table according to a
systematic process." First, the USSG assigned each defendant an
"offense level" based on the crime(s) of conviction." Then, the guidelines adjusted each offense level to account for considerations such as
degree of involvement, use of a firearm, cooperation with authorities,

64. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987.
65. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1) & (2) (2006)).
66. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)-(C)).
67. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2019-2024 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006)).
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MVANuAL (2011). The acronym "USSG" is the USSC's
self-styled shorthand for the Guidelines Manual, simply meaning "United States
Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at ii.
69. Id. § 1AL.
70. Id. § 5A. A copy of the sentencing table has been appended to this comment for
reference.
71. See id. § 1B1.1.
72. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2).
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and numerous others." After that, defendants would be assigned a
"criminal history category" by counting past criminal convictions.
Next, the court would find the sentencing range on the sentencing table
that corresponded to the defendant's final offense level and criminal
Lastly, the court would consider any options for
history category.
imposing a fine, a probated sentence, restitution, or any other sentencing
conditions."
To help with the USSG's implementation, the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 contained explicit instructions for federal judges imposing
criminal sentences. 77 Subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 35538 requires
that the court consider not only the sentencing range given by the
USSG, but a wide variety of other factual and policy concerns." Of
note are factors requiring the weighing of various social policies that
justify criminal punishment, the desirability of uniformity in sentencing,
and the general nature of the offense."o However, subsection (b) of the
same statute then obligates that the sentencing court, after considering
all of the factors listed in subsection (a), "shall impose a sentence of the
kind, and within the range, referred to in [the USSG] unless the court
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission.""
This created a system in which sentencing courts were under a
statutory mandate to weigh and balance numerous complex social and
governmental policies, and then, despite those findings, choose a
sentence within a narrow, limited range.82 On the other hand, this
curbing of judicial discretion was the first solution in "almost a century"
that effectively ended the "[flundamental and widespread dissatisfaction
with the uncertainties and the disparities" of federal sentencing 3
Predictably, since these new rules altered the sentences federal convicts

73. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3).
74. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(6).
75. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(7).
76. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(8).
77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212,98 Stat. at 1989(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
82. See id. § 3553 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
83. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1989), affg United States v.
Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
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would receive and ended the federal parole system," challenges to the
new sentencing regulations quickly followed their taking effect on
November 1, 1987.
The first published case challenging the constitutionality of the USSG
appears to be United States v. Arnold," followed four days later by
Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. v. U.S. Sentencing Commission.86
The general nature of both constitutional complaints was that the USSG
exceeded Congress's authority to delegate its power to determine
sentences, and that, even though the USSC was placed within the
judicial branch, the required presence of Article 1117 judges on the
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine." In Arnold,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
fully endorsed the separation of powers argument and ruled that the
USSG, and the Commission itself, were both unconstitutional." This
result, however, was not unanimous among federal courts. In Federal
Defenders, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that federal public defenders did not have standing to challenge the
guidelines because they had not yet been injured in a constitutionally
cognizable way.o Even though the USSG would impact every future
federal defendant that the public defenders would represent, the
allegations that those public defenders would suffer from an increased
workload that would harm their ability to represent clients effectively
were not enough to create a case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.9 ' Finally, on the opposite end of the
spectrum, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana fully approbated the USSC and USSG in another early case,
United States v. Chambless.9 2
Given the "imperative public importance of the issue . .. and because

of the disarray among the Federal District Courts," the question of the
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, eliminated parole for federal prisoners by requiring release only "on the date
of the expiration of the prisoner's term of imprisonment," with no early release available,
except for a maximum of fifty-four days per year of additional credit for time served earned
for each year of good behavior after the first year served. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)-(b) (2006).
85. 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
86. 680 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1988).
87. U.S. CONST. art. III.
88. See, e.g., Arnold, 678 F. Supp. at 1466-72.
89. Id. at 1465; see also United States v. Smith, 686 F. Supp. 847, 865 (D. Colo. 1988)
(holding presence of Article III judges on Sentencing Commission violates separation of
powers).
90. 680 F. Supp. at 27-32.
91. Id. at 32.
92. 680 F. Supp. 793, 797-800 (E.D. La. 1988).
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guidelines' constitutionality was put on the fast track to review by the
United States Supreme Court." In United States v. Johnson," three
defendants, who had been convicted and were awaiting sentencing in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, filed
motions with the court seeking a declaration that the USSG were
unconstitutional." Seven judges on the court convened as a panel and
heard arguments on the issue.96 The court then issued an opinion-written by Judge Howard Sachs, joined in the judgment only by
three other judges, and dissented to by Chief Judge Scott
Wright-upholding the USSC and USSG." The defendants appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit." However,
before the Eighth Circuit could rule on the case, both sides filed petitions
for certiorari before judgment with the United States Supreme Court,
and, in an unusual move by the Court, the petitions were granted.9 9
In resolving the case, which was restyled Mistretta v. United States,1 00
the Court considered both the nondelegation doctrine and separation of
powers arguments that had been tested in the various district courts
and, ultimately, found that both the USSC and the USSG complied with
the Constitution.10 ' Thus, in less than 15 months, the USSG went
from being newly-passed judicial regulations, on November 1, 1987, to
being fully upheld by the Supreme Court on January 18, 1989.102
Crack and Cocaine Sentencing
The original version of the Controlled Substances Act, as passed in
1970, contained no mention of cocaine base.os Instead, the listing
under Schedule II that addressed cocaine was grouped with other
C.

93. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
94. 682 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989).
95. Id. at 1033.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1035. The opinion itself makes no mention of the positions taken by the two
judges who were on the panel, but whose positions were not accounted for. Indeed, the
opinion does not even identify those two remaining judges by name.
98. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 362.
99. Id. at 371. The Supreme Court only grants a petition for certiorari before
judgment "upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to
justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination
in [the Supreme] Court." SUP. CT. R. 11.
100. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
101. Id. at 412.
102. See id.
103. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970).
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"substances of vegetable origin," with the prohibition written in terms
of coca leaves.'o Specifically prohibited were
Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca
leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof
which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, except that the substances shall not include decocainized coca
leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not contain
cocaine or ecgonine.'os
While this description would still include cocaine HCl, as a derivative of
coca leaves,oe as well as freebase or crack cocaine, as chemically
equivalent derivatives of a derivative,' 7 the shift in perspective is
noteworthy. Furthermore, penalties under the Controlled Substance Act
(CSA) did not assign different punishments based on the quantity of
drugs possessed.'o Instead, the original form of the CSA punished
"manufactur[ing], distribut[ing], or dispens[ing], or possess[ing] with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense" cocaine, or its derivatives
with "a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years, a fine of not
more than $15,000, or both.")0 9
Even sentencing for simple possession received dramatically different
treatment in the original CSA than it does today."0 Absent further
intent, crimes of simple possession had one prescribed punishment under
the CSA, without regard to the controlled substance involved, the
schedule the substance was classified under, or the quantity of the
substance possessed."' That punishment was "a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than $5,000, or
The statute's only aggravating factor allowed for the
both....""
sentence to be doubled for those with prior convictions for simple
Highlighting the relative leniency with which the
possession."'
Ninety-First Congress treated simple drug possession, there was even a

104. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202(c), 84 Stat. at 1250.
105. Id.
106. Powdered Cocaine Fast Facts,supra note 24.
107. Crack Cocaine Fast Facts, supra note 47.
108. See generally Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 401-404, 84 Stat.
at 1260-65.
109. Id. § 401(a)-(b), 84 Stat. at 1260-62. The sentencing for Schedule I and II drugs
varied based on whether the drug in question was a narcotic, such as a painkiller, or not.
See id. Because cocaine is a stimulant it was punished less harshly under the CSA. See
id.
110. See id. § 404, 84 Stat. at 1264.
111. Id. § 404(a), 84 Stat. at 1264.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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provision that allowed judges to place first-time defendants charged with
This system,
simple possession on probation before adjudication."
which did not account for quantity at all, punished the sale of 5 grams
of marijuana more severely than the simple possession of 500 tons of
heroin and lasted until 1986.xis
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,116 which
completely overhauled the federal sentencing of drug-related offenses."' For the first time since 1970, sentencing judges had to consider
more than just intent to traffic or distribute." Now, they also had to
consider both the substance involved and its quantity, and the sentence
given was dependent on each."' In the year leading up to the enactment of this major legislation, both houses of Congress had a number of
hearings addressing questions on the current state of American antidrug efforts, as well as what more could or should be done to address
drug trafficking, sales, and use throughout the country.12 0 These
hearings sought to view America's drug problem from every angle and
included testimony from recovering addicts, their family members, law
enforcement, interdiction officials, professional athletes, and others. 2
In June 1986, fuel was added to the fire of media attention on
skyrocketing cocaine use when first round NBA draft pick Len Bias died
of a cocaine overdose, followed eight days later by Cleveland Browns
safety Don Rogers. 12 2 This led members of Congress to question the
roles of professional athletes as influences and role models for children
as young as twelve who were pressured by their peers into trying this

114. See id. § 404(b), 84 Stat. at 1264. This allowed the defendants an opportunity to
complete a period of up to one year of probation and have the charges against them
dismissed, with only a sealed record showing that the defendant had used up that chance
in case of a later arrest on the same charge. See id. If the defendant under this program
later violated the terms of the probation, then adjudication of guilt would be entered at
that time and sentencing would occur anew. See id.
115. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 801-971).
116. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
117. See id.
118. See id. § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to -4.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., The Crack Cocaine Crisis:Joint HearingBefore the Select H. Comm. on
Narcotics Abuse and Control and Select H. Comm. on Children,Youth, and Families,99th
Cong. (1986); see also "Crack" Cocaine: HearingBefore the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 99th Cong. (1986).
121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120.
122. See Associated Press, Cocaine Killed Rogers, Tests Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1986, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/30/sports/cocaine-killed-rogers-testsindicate.html.
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new and dangerous drug. 123 Other testimony declared that a person
could become completely addicted to crack after just one or two uses.12 4
Crack houses opened up across New York'25 and other major cities,
operating in residential areas and serving crack to anyone with money
while providing the kind of social consumption atmosphere that bars and
nightclubs currently provide with respect to alcohol.126 Some crack
houses in the Washington, D.C., area even let customers purchase crack
on credit, but it was considered a matter of "everyday business" for the
proprietors to murder those who had racked up as little as $2000, or
less, in debt.127 This was apparently intended to serve as a warning
to others who wished to go into debt with their suppliers just to support
their habits. 28
There was also an escalating amount of gang involvement with the
crack trade.129 The use of crack throughout the nation was widely
referred to as an "epidemic."3 o Soon the term began to apply to the
concomitant gang activity as well.'
Murder and other crime rates in
major cities rose sharply as gang members competed for blocks or
neighborhoods in which to sell crack.13 2
Over the course of 1986, a number of bills were proposed in Congress,
suggesting punishments based on differing limits and quantities of
various controlled substances.'
While most (if not all) punished

123. See The Crack Cocaine Crisis, supra note 120, at 20-22 (statements of Kevin
Grevey, former player, Washington Bullets basketball team, President, Off Season, Inc.;
William Scheu, player-coach, USA Legends basketball team, Director, Youth Sports Drug
Awareness Program).
124. "Crack"Cocaine, supra note 120, at 44 (testimony of Michael Taylor, former crack
house employee).
125. Peter Kerr, Opium Dens for the Crack Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1986, available
at http://www.nytimes.com1986/05/18/nyregion/opium-dens-for-the-crack-era.html.
126. See "Crack"Cocaine, supranote 120, at 38-39 (testimony of Michael Taylor, former
crack house employee).
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id.
129. Jim Morris, Gangs at War in LA Streets-DrugMoney FuelingDeadly Rivalries,
Officials Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19, 1986, at Al.
130. See, e.g., The Crack Cocaine Crisis, supra note 120, at 7 (statement of Rep. Mel
Levine).
131. See David Enscoe, Holdups Blamed on Gang-Drug Users Terrorize Convenience
Stores, SouTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 1986, at 1B.
132. See Morris,supra note 129.
133. See, e.g., Drug Trade Elimination Act, H.R. 5329, 99th Cong. (1986); Drug Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, H.R. 5334,99th Cong. (1986); Drug Eradication Act
of 1986, H.R. 5358, 99th Cong. (1986); Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986,
H.R. 5394, 99th Cong. (1986); Comprehensive Narcotics Control Act of 1986, S. 2798, 99th
Cong. (1986); Drug-Free America Act of 1986, S. 2849, 99th Cong. (1986); and Drug
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crack-related crimes more severely than crimes related to cocaine HC1,
the ratio of the quantity of cocaine HCI to crack that subjected an
offender to a given level of punishment varied widely." However, as
the year progressed-and greater volumes of testimony came in concerning the unstoppable dangers of crack-that ratio grew ever larger.3 5
By the time the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 passed into law, the ratio
stood at 100:1, with the statutory sentencing range for possession of 500
grams (1.1 pounds) of cocaine HCl or 5 grams (0.18 ounces-about the
weight of a nickel) of crack cocaine being identical at five to forty years
in prison.'36
It was not long, however, before the legal community noticed a
powerful incidental effect of the new, harsh crack cocaine laws: almost
all of the criminals convicted of crack-related offenses were AfricanAmerican, while most of the criminals convicted of powder-cocainerelated offenses were Caucasian.'3 7 In one such case, State v. Russell,' it was "show[n] that of all persons charged with possession of
cocaine base [in Minnesota] in 1988, 96.6% were black. Of all persons
charged with possession of powder cocaine, 79.6% were white."'39 Even
40
the Supreme Court, in the 1996 case United States v. Armstrong,o
heard a claim of selective prosecution in a federal crack case. In
Armstrong, the Court cited statistics showing that more than 90% of
sentences issued for crack offenses in 1994 were against black defendants.14' However, the Court ultimately held that, without proof of the
non-prosecution of non-blacks who were caught committing crack
offenses, no selective prosecution claim could lie. 14' Lastly, "[b]ills that
would have addressed this disparity by reducing the powder-to-crack

Enforcement Act of 1986, S. 2850, 99th Cong. (1986).
134. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 117 (1995), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/Legislativeand
PublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony _andReports/DrugTopics/199502_RtCCocaine
Sentencing-Policy/chap5-8.pdf.
135. See id. at 117-18.
136. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to -4. It is also interesting to note
that the sentence for possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine was also equivalent to that for
1 gram of LSD or quantities in excess of 100 kilograms (220 pounds) of marijuana.
137. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886,887-89 & n.1 (Minn. 1991) (holding that
the state crack and cocaine sentencing laws, which punished possession of three grams of
crack or ten grams of cocaine equally, violated state equal protection guarantees because
the law had a discriminatory impact on African-Americans).
138. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
139. Id. at 887 n.1.
140. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
141. See id. at 469.
142. Id. at 470-71.
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ratio were introduced in Congress in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, but these measures
and similar proposals offered by the United States Sentencing Commission ... failed."14 3

D. Modern Developments
1. Mistretta Revisited, but not Overruled. The United States
Supreme Court first presaged the fall of the mandatory USSG in its
Blakely v. Washington'" decision. In Blakely, Ralph Blakely, Jr.
received divorce papers from his then-wife. Blakely had a history of
psychological and personality disorders and abducted his wife by binding
her with duct tape and forcing her at knifepoint to climb into a wooden
box in Blakely's pickup truck, all the while begging her to dismiss the
divorce proceedings against him. Blakely then ordered the couple's
teenage son to follow behind him in another car and threatened to shoot
his wife with a shotgun if the boy did not comply. After his arrest,
Blakely pleaded guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic
45
violence and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime,1 which
would normally warrant a sentence in the range of 49 to 53 months'
46
imprisonment under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act.1
Washington's sentencing system operated much like the USSG.147
First, a criminal statute listed any mandatory minimum or maximum
sentences that an offense might carry.148 Then, separate statutory
provisions pared the specific sentence that a defendant might receive
down to a narrow range, based on things like the severity of the
offense.' 49 Lastly, the sentencing court had the authority to impose a
sentence above the maximum (mandatory) guidelines range if it made
findings of certain aggravating factors, by a preponderance of the

143. Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems To Be the Hardest Word: The FairSentencing Act of
2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 766-67 (2011) (citations
omitted). Professor Graham's essay provides an in-depth review of the social and political
forces that led to the correction of the 100:1 crack and powdered cocaine ratio with the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, as well as a comparison with and
commentary on current attitudes and sentencing policies with regard to methamphetamines.
144. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
145. Id. at 298-301.
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2011), available at http-//apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/.
147. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.
148. See id. at 299.
149. See id.
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evidence, that could "justify an exceptional sentence.""so In Blakely's
case, the sentencing court found that the crime was carried out "with
deliberate cruelty" and sentenced Blakely to an enhanced term of 7.5
years in prison.5 1 This increased Blakely's sentence to 37 months
beyond the general statutory maximum.15 2
In deciding Blakely, the Supreme Court first turned to its own recent
case law, reiterating that "[lther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."15 3 The state of Washington argued that "the
relevant statutory maximum" was the 10-year maximum written in the
kidnapping statute, and not the 53-month maximum in the applicable
sentencing range.15 4 The Court found this argument unpersuasive,
though, and held that
the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not
found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment,
and the judge exceeds his proper authority."'s
Thus, imposing a higher sentence violated Blakely's right to a trial by
jury since the sentencing range, though lower than the "maximum"
sentence for the crime of conviction, was nonetheless binding on the
sentencing judge. 15
In 2005, when the Supreme Court revisited its holding in Mistretta,
any doubts cast over the USSG by the Blakely decision were firmly
cemented in place.'
This case, United States v. Booker,se considered the claims of two federal defendants who had been convicted of
crack-related offenses. 5 9 The first defendant, Freddie Booker, had
been indicted for possession of at least 50 grams of crack with intent to
distribute. Based on evidence presented at trial that he had actually
possessed 92.5 grams of crack, the jury convicted him. Under the USSG,

150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505(2)(b).
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(3)(a).
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.
Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
Id. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 303-04 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 304-05.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 241-43 (2005).
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 227-29.
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as they existed at the time of Booker's conviction, this would have
corresponded to a sentence of 210-262 months in prison. Rather than
follow the mandatory sentencing range imposed by the guidelines,
however, the trial judge instead held a sentencing hearing at which he
concluded that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Booker actually
possessed a total of 685.5 grams of crack cocaine, and that he was guilty
of obstructing justice. On the basis of these additional findings, the trial
judge abandoned the mandatory maximum sentence of 21 years and 10
months, and instead sentenced Booker to 30 years in prison.160 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
vacated Booker's sentence on the premise that it violated the Supreme
Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey16 ' that "[oither than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'6 2
In the case of the second defendant, Ducan Fanfan was convicted of
"conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least
500 grams of cocaine [HCl]."16 In delivering a special verdict, the jury
made a specific finding that "the amount of cocaine [was] 500 or more
grams.""' This alone would have authorized a sentence of no more
than 78 months in prison. 65 In a sentencing hearing that occurred
about 8 months after the jury verdict was entered against Fanfan, the
trial judge issued an unpublished opinion in which he openly agonized
over how to apply the Supreme Court's holding in Blakely, then just 4
days old. 166
Despite the fact that the trial judge had made additional findings at
sentencing-that Fanfan was actually responsible for 2.5 kilograms of
cocaine as well as 261.6 grams of crack, and that Fanfan was an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the conspiracy-the court
yielded to the new holding in Blakely.167 Because "the relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings,",16 the court could not continue the practice

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
2004).
167.
168.

Id. at 227.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
See Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *2 (D. Me. June 28,
Booker, 543 U.S. at 228-29.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
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of ruling on aggravating factors under the preponderance of the evidence
standard once the jury had returned a verdict, unless those factors did
not increase the sentence beyond the maximum sentence available under
Thus, even though the aggravating factors
the jury verdict alone.'
found in Fanfan's case would have resulted in a sentence of 15 to 16
The United States
years, he was only sentenced to 6.5 years.'
appealed the sentence to the United States Court ofAppeals for the First
Circuit, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari before
judgment and joined Fanfan's case to Booker's."n
In another unusual turn, the Booker case was decided with all nine
sitting justices joining or authoring opinions of the Court, and eight of
Each of the two opinions of the Court
the nine issuing dissents."
answered one of the questions on appeal. The first opinion, authored by
Justice Stevens, and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, addressed the question of "whether [the] application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines [to Booker's and Fanfan's cases] violated
the Sixth Amendment.""' The second opinion, authored by Justice
Breyer, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg, addressed the fact that Justice Stevens's
opinion found a constitutional violation and answered the question of
what can be done to save part or all of the statutory scheme behind the
USSG so as to cure the constitutional defect." With Justice Ginsburg
being the only one to join the entire opinion, the eight remaining justices
all issued or joined dissents, each explaining their opposition to the half
of the opinion they did not join."'
Specifically, the first opinion in Booker held that "The [Sentencing]
Guidelines as written .. . are mandatory and binding on all judges....
[S]ubsection (b) [of 18 U.S.C. § 35531 directs that the court 'shall impose
a sentence of the kind, and within the range' established by the
Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases.' 1 6 The
Court even points to similar language in the Mistretta case, which first
upheld the constitutionality of the USSC and USSG in 1989."
However, the Court held that where the USSG requires the imposition

169.
170.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 228-29.
Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *2-3.

171. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229.
172. See id. at 225-334.
173. Id. at 226.
174.

Id. at 245.

175. See id. at 271-334.
176. Id. at 233-34.
177.

Id. at 233 n.2.
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of a sentence based on facts not found by a jury, defendants are deprived
of their Sixth Amendment178 rights.179 The Court noted that
[tihe Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that,
before depriving a man of [ten] more years of his liberty, the State
should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to
the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, rather
than a lone employee of the State.'o
Because the demands of the Sixth Amendment and the Guidelines
Manual were found to be at odds, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment must prevail and that the USSG were unconstitutional. 8 1
The second opinion in Booker addressed whether any part of the USSG
or the statutes that supported or created them could be severed from the
After examining the
unconstitutional provisions and left intact.'
legislative history and congressional intent behind the creation of the
USSC and adoption of the USSG, the Court held that the constitutional
defect could and should be cured simply by excising those portions of the
enabling statutes that made the USSG binding upon trial courts.8 s
The Court concluded by noting that this new change in the rules of
criminal procedure should be applied to all cases that were not then
final, but that the holding was not so extensive as to find that all
criminal sentences under the prior rule were handed down in violation
of the Sixth Amendment.184
2. Fixing the 100:1 Sentencing Ratio. In 2007, the USSC passed
USSG Amendment 706"a as an interim measure for correcting the
100:1 crack-to-powder sentencing disparity and spurring congressional
action to more adequately address the issue. 8 6 While the USSC

178. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
179. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
180. Id. at 238 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313-14).
181. Id. at 244-45.
182. Id. at 245.
183. Id. at 246-65. In light of the Court's holding that the USSG could not be binding
on sentencing judges, the Court's severability analysis compared the likelihood that the
98th Congress would have preferred that the entire Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 be
invalidated to the likelihood that the 98th Congress would have still passed the Act
without the unconstitutional provisions. Id. at 249.
184. Id. at 268.
185. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES at 42 (2007),
availableathttp*//www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Official_Text/20070501_Amendments
.pdf.
186. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. III, amend. 706 (2011)
(restating the amendment and giving the USSC's intent behind passing the amendment).
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lacked authority to eliminate the mandatory minimum sentences for
possession of at least 5 or 50 grams of cocaine base, the USSC used
Amendment 706 to lower by two the USSG offense levels of all other
threshold amounts of cocaine base-related offenses.""7 This reduction
in offense levels became effective November 1, 2007,188 and was then
made retroactive on March 3, 2008, when Amendment 713 to the USSG
took effect."' As a result of this retroactivity amendment, prisoners
who had been sentenced under the previous offense levels were now
eligible to file a motion for sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582
(c)(2).19o

While the 2007 USSG amendments did provide some relief, the crack
cocaine sentencing disparity was not fully addressed until Congress
9 which amended the
passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),o'
Controlled Substance Act by eliminating mandatory minimum sentences
for persons convicted of simple possession of more than 5 grams of
crack.192 The FSA also changed the threshold quantities of crack or
cocaine base that one must possess with intent to distribute, manufacture, dispense, import, or export in order to be subject to possible 5-to40-years or 10-years-to-life sentencing ranges.'s Where defendants
convicted between 1986 and 2010 for possession with intent to distribute
would receive sentences in the range of 5 to 40 years for having at least
5 grams of crack or 500 grams of cocaine, the same sentence is now
required only for those who have at least 28 grams of crack or cocaine
base (with the cocaine thresholds staying the same).' 4 Likewise, a
prison sentence of between 10 years and life now awaits only those
convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 280 grams of
cocaine base, rather than 50 grams, which was the threshold set in
1986.'
This has reduced the old 100:1 sentencing disparity to a

17.86:1 ratio. 196

Note that the commentary to Amendment 706 was further revised by the technical
Amendment 711, also passed in 2007. See id. amend. 711.
187. See id. amend. 706.
188. Id.
189. Id. amend. 713.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
191. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. ch. 13).
192. Id. § 3 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).
193. Id. § 2 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b)).
194. Compareid., with Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to -4.
195. See sources cited supra note 194.
196. Id.
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In light of the changes made by the FSA, the USSC promulgated
emergency amendments to the USSG that accounted for the reduced
sentences for crack offenders."' These amendments adjusted the
recommended sentences for crimes involving various quantities of
cocaine base, adopting the same 17.86:1 ratio throughout.9 s On April
28, 2011, these emergency amendments were submitted to Congress
without change for approval to be permanently included in the
USSG."' By operation of 28 U.S.C. § 994(p),200 the proposed permanent amendments became effective November 1, 2011, when Congress
failed to modify or disapprove of the proposal. 201 Additionally, by the
unanimous vote of the USSC, the amendment applying the 17.86:1 crack
ratio throughout the USSG was also made retroactive, as of November
1, 2011.202 The USSC estimates that this will make a possible sentence reduction available to 12,040 federal inmates, giving individual
sentence reductions that range from less than a month to over 10 years,
with the average projected sentence reduction being 37 months.203
III.

A.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

Post-Booker Interpretations of Federal Sentencing Practices

1. 2007: A Year Spent Clarifying Booker. Though the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Booker 204 unilaterally took

197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. 1-35 (2010).
198. Id. at 10-15.
199. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2011),

availableathttp://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/OfficialText/20ll0428_Amendments
.pdf
200. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
201. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,563 (Sept. 21,
2011). "On April 28, 2011, the Commission submitted to the Congress amendments to the
sentencing guidelines and official commentary, which become effective on November 1,
2011, unless Congress acts to the contrary." Id.
202. News Release, United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing
Commission Votes Unanimously To Apply Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Amendment to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Retroactively (June 30, 2011), availableat http://www.ussc
.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/Newsroom/PressReleases/20110630_PressRelease.pdf
203. Memorandum from United States Sentencing Commission, Office of Research and
Data and Office of General Counsel to Chair Saris, Commissioners, and Judith Sheon,
Analysis of Impact of Guideline Implementation of the FairSentencing Act of 2010 if the
Amendment Were Applied Retroactively 10, 28 (May 20, 2011), available at http//www
.ussc.gov/Research/RetroactivityAnalyses/FairSentencingAct/20110520 CrackRetroact
ivityAnalysis.pdf.
204. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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away the mandate that the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG) 205 had carried for the first eighteen years of their existence, 206 the transition in trial courts from mandatory to advisory
sentencing guidelines was not so simple. In 2007 alone, the Supreme
Court reapplied Booker in four new cases. The first, Cunningham v.
207 struck down California's sentencing scheme, which
California,
assigned each crime a "lower, middle, and upper term sentence."208
These "terms" were not sentencing ranges, but three unique, discrete
possible sentences that were the only available sentences for a given
crime.209 In Cunningham's case, a conviction for continuous sexual
abuse of a child under the age of fourteen carried a lower term sentence
of six years, a middle term sentence of twelve years, and an upper term
sentence of sixteen years.21 0 State sentencing laws then required the
sentencing courts to impose the middle term sentence, unless there were
mitigating or aggravating "factswhich justify the imposition of the upper
[or lower] prison term" and are "established by a preponderance of the

evidence." 2 11

The Supreme Court, citing both Blakely v. Washington2 1 2 and
Booker, held that the statutory requirement to impose the middle term
sentence meant that the right to jury trial was implicated by any
attempt to find facts for the purpose of imposing an upper term
sentence. 21 3 Thus, "the ball" was placed back into "California's court"
for the purpose of rewriting the state's sentencing laws to comply with
the Apprendi214 -Booker line of cases.21 5
The next two cases focused on the "reasonableness" standard that
Booker applied to the imposition of federal sentences. Both Rita v.
United StateS216 and Claiborne v. United States2 17 were argued on
the same day in the October 2006 Term of Court.2 18 In Rita, the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina

205.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011).

206. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
207. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
208. Id. at 277, 293.
209. Id. at 292.
210. Id. at 275.
211. Id. at 278 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
212. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
213. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293.
214. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
215. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293-94.
216. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
217. 551 U.S. 87 (2007), dismissed as moot. But see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
40-41 (2007) (discussing and then reaching the issues presented in Claiborne).
218. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 40.
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convicted Victor Rita of perjury for false statements he made in front of
a grand jury relating to the investigation of a company believed to be
illegally selling kits that could be made into machine guns."' At his
sentencing hearing, the court calculated that the (now advisory) USSG
recommended a sentence of 33 to 41 months' imprisonment, as this was
Rita's first offense. Rita argued to the court that he should get a belowguidelines sentence because of his numerous physical ailments, his full
career of military service, and because he feared that he might be
targeted by any inmates who might have recognized Rita from his past
criminal justice work. 2 o After hearing from the Government, the court
weighed the factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)22 1 and decided that
the USSG recommended range was appropriate, but sentenced Rita the
minimum under that range, 33 months in prison.2 2 2
Rita appealed, arguing that his sentence was unreasonable.223 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that any sentence within the guidelines range was "presumptively
reasonable" and that Rita was not entitled to have his sentence
overturned.2 24 The Supreme Court upheld the presumption of reasonableness, but also limited the presumption's strength by highlighting the
Court's reasons for supporting such a presumption.22 5 Specifically, the
Court held:
For one thing, the presumption is not binding. It does not, like a trialrelated evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other,
shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their
case. Nor does the presumption reflect strong judicial deference of the
kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater fact finding leeway to
an expert agency than to a district judge. Rather, the presumption
reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a
within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and
the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as
to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determina-

219. 551 U.S. at 341.
220. Id. at 342-45.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). This weighing of factors was explicitly required in the
Booker decision and proved to be a regular source of enlightenment for the Supreme
Court's subsequent rulings that applied Booker. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 222.
222. Rita, 551 U.S. at 345.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 345-46 (quoting United States v. Rivera-Magana, 177 F. App'x 358, 358 (4th
Cir. 2006)).
225. Id. at 347.
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tion significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a

reasonable one.226

Also, the Court held that, because Congress charged both the USSC and
the sentencing judge with applying the same guiding factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), the fact that each independently arrive at similar
sentences for the same crime committed by the same kind of criminal
further impresses upon reviewing courts the idea that there is a
heightened probability that both are reasonable.
Rita's twin case, Claiborne v. United States,22 8 focused on the
question of whether sentences below the guidelines range could be
reviewed under a "proportionality test" that used the ratio between the
guidelines range and the sentence imposed as a measure of reasonableness. 229 It also sought to answer the question of whether appellate
courts could require findings of extraordinary circumstances to justify
sentences that fell far below the guidelines range.230 Unfortunately,
Mario Claiborne died on May 30, 2007, less than a month before the
decision in Rita (and possibly his own case as well) issued. 23 1 Therefore, the Claiborne case was rendered moot. 23 2 Undeterred, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a new case that presented identical
issues, Gall v. United States,3 3 less than two weeks after Claiborne's
death.234
In Gall, Brian Gall joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the street
drug ecstasy. At the time, Gall was a sophomore at the University of
Iowa, and was himself a user of cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana. He
spent seven months delivering various quantities of ecstasy tablets from
one supplier to several dealers, who then sold the tablets to those who
used the drug. During the 7-month period, Gall made over $30,000 and
at least 2500 grams of ecstasy passed through his hands. However, after
seven months, he stopped using ecstasy himself and advised his coconspirators that he would no longer participate in their operations.
Gall graduated from the university in 2002. Soon thereafter, he started
a successful construction company that installed window and door

226. Id. (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 347, 350-51.
228. 551 U.S. 87 (2007), dismissed as moot.
229. Gall, 552 U.S. at 40-41 (citing Claiborne v. United States, 549 U.S. 1016 (2006)).
230. Id.
231. Claiborne, 551 U.S. at 87.
232. Id. at 87-88.
233. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
234. See Gall v. United States, 551 U.S. 1113 (2007) (granting cert.); see also Gall, 552
U.S. at 41 ("We granted certiorari in the case before us today in order to reach that
question, left unanswered last Term.").
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fixtures, and he became engaged to be married. Then, in 2004, Gall's
past caught up with him when a grand jury indicted Gall and seven
others for their participation in the ecstasy distribution ring. Gall
entered into a plea agreement and his probation officer prepared a
presentence report recommending a sentence of 30 to 37 months in
prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court was presented with an
abundance of evidence from a wide variety of relatives, friends,
neighbors, and business contacts unanimously praising Gall's reformed
life and character. As a result, the court sentenced Gall to 36 months
of probation."'
The Government appealed Gall's sentence of probation, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the probationary
sentence "amounted to a 100% downward variance," which must
necessarily be supported by "extraordinary circumstances."236 Applying Booker, the Supreme Court held that the only requirements placed
on federal courts during sentencing were that the sentence imposed must
be reasonable and that it must be given only after considering the
sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."' Next, the Court
plainly rejected the requirement that sentences falling significantly
outside of the USSG range should include "extraordinary" findings as
justification.3 Instead, it held that such a demand might give rise to
an impermissible presumption that a sentence outside of the USSG
range is unreasonable."' Finally, the Court also rejected the idea that
mathematical percentages could be used to create some kind of
proportionality test that might serve as a basis for evaluating reasonableness, because such a test would amount to reviewing sentences with
less deference than the Booker-prescribed "abuse-of-discretion" standard. 240
The Supreme Court issued the last of 2007's Apprendi-Bookerdescendent decisions, Kimbrough v. United States,241 on the same day
as the opinion in Gall. Kimbrough was the first United States Supreme
Court case to address both the 100:1 crack cocaine sentencing disparity
and the new "reasonableness" standard for sentences, as announced in
Booker.12 In that case, Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to conspira-

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Gall, 552 U.S. at 41-43.
Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 46, 49-50 n.6.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47 n.3.
Id. at 47-49.
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
See id. at 90-91.
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cy to distribute crack and powder cocaine, possession of more than 50
grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of powder
cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. For his crimes, Kimbrough was
subject to a mandatory statutory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment for
the drug crimes, plus a mandatory consecutive 5 years for the firearms
offense. At his sentencing hearing, the sentencing court considered the
USSG range for Kimbrough's criminal conduct and arrived at a
recommended range of between 19 and 22.5 years in prison. The
sentencing court contrasted this applicable USSG range with the USSG
maximum that would have applied had Kimbrough dealt only in
powdered cocaine, 8 years and 10 months, and decided that the statutory
minimum was more than adequate. Thus, the court sentenced Kimbrough to only the mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment
(followed by 5 years on supervised release), representing a downward
variance of 4 years below the minimum USSG recommendation. 2"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the
sentence and held that "a sentence outside the guidelines range is per
se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing
disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses.""' This holding
framed the question on review in the Supreme Court, though it was
reworded to specifically address whether the Booker decision also
rendered the 100:1 sentencing ratio advisory.245 In resolving the
question on certiorari, the Court revisited its analysis of the deference
given to sentences that fall within the USSG guidelines." In particular, the Court discussed its holdings in Rita and Gall, noting that the
presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences comes in
large part from the fact that, as to most offenses, the USSC had used the
empirical data from thousands of actual past cases to determine, within
a fairly narrow range, what the sentencing norms actually were for the
corresponding crimes. "
However, the Court pointed out that, with respect to crack cocaine
offenses, the USSC took a different approach and based sentencing
ranges solely on the cutoff points given in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986." Furthermore, in light of reports from the USSC itself stating

243. Id. at 91-93.
244. Id. at 93 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 108-09.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 109; see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
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that the 100:1 sentencing disparity for crack offenses produces sentences
that are "greater than necessary" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court
held that it would not be a reversible abuse of discretion for a sentencing
judge to reach the same conclusion.2 49 Thus, the Court upheld Kimbrough's 15-year sentence as reasonable.2 50
2. 2008 through 2010: The USSG and Crack Sentencing Policies
Interweave. Over the three years following the Kimbrough decision,
the Supreme Court would have occasion to reapply Booker four more
times, with cases tending to include progressively more discussion of the
crack-powder sentencing disparity.25 1 In 2008, the Court decided
Irizarry v. United States,"' which concerned a criminal defendant's
asserted right to advance notice if the sentencing court is considering a
sentence above the USSG range.2 " Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to
one count of making a threatening interstate communication, and at his
plea hearing he admitted to actually sending dozens of similar e-mails
to his ex-wife. Those e-mails, sent in violation of a restraining order,
repeatedly threatened to kill both his ex-wife and her new husband.
Irizarry also admitted that the e-mail messages were intended to convey
true threats and that his actions were knowingly and willfully carried
out. Irizarry had even sought out one of his fellow inmates to kill his exwife and her new husband for him. Irizarry's presentence report
detailed concerns that his criminal history category under the USSG
might not accurately account for his prior criminal history or propensity
to recidivate.2 54
At Irizarry's sentencing hearing, his ex-wife took the stand and
testified in detail about his history of domestic violence; her reasons for
seeking a restraining order against him; his threats to harm her, her
friends, and her family; and also her actual belief that Irizarry would act
on his threats if given the opportunity. Evidence was also presented
showing that, at the time of his arrest, Irizarry had documents in his
vehicle that reinforced the claim that he was actually planning to hunt
down his ex-wife and children. In his defense, Irizarry asserted that he
did not mean what he said in any of the threatening messages, that he

249.
250.
251.
States,
252.
253.
254.

Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110.
Id. at 111-12.
See generally Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010); Spears v. United
555 U.S. 261 (2009); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008).
553 U.S. 708 (2008).
See id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710.
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took full responsibility for his actions, and that he never spoke to his
cellmates about killing his ex-wife's new husband."
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial judge
announced the findings of the court, ruling:
I find the guideline range is not appropriate in this case. I find Mr.
Irizarry's conduct most disturbing. I am sincerely convinced that he
will continue, as his ex-wife testified, in this conduct regardless of what
this court does and regardless of what kind of supervision he's under.
And based upon that, I find that the maximum time that he can be
incapacitated is what is best for society, and therefore the guideline
range, I think, is not high enough. The guideline range goes up to 51
months, which is only nine months shorter than the statutory
maximum. But I think in Mr. Irizarry's case the statutory maximum
is what's appropriate, and that's what I'm going to sentence him. 5 6
In addition to the 5-year statutory maximum, the court also sentenced
Irizarry to a 3-year period of supervised release.2 5 7
Irizarry appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court's precedent in
Burns v. United States258 required notice of a court's intent to sua
sponte impose a sentence greater than the maximum stated in the USSG
The United States Court of Appeals for the
sentencing range.2'
Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court's Booker decision
amounted to constructive notice that all future sentencing hearings had
the possibility of resulting in sentences outside of the advisory USSG
range.2 60 Therefore, parties no longer required specific notice when a
sentencing court sought to exercise its new judicial discretion.16 1
The Supreme Court wholeheartedly agreed.26 2 The Court held that
"neither the Government nor the defendant may place the same degree
of reliance on the type of 'expectancy' that gave rise to a special need for

255. Id. at 711.
256. Id. at 711-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Id. at 712.

258. 501 U.S. 129 (1991).
259. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 712. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
required parties to have a chance to comment on the findings relating the sentence under
consideration by a sentencing court. The Court in Burns held that under the thenmandatory USSG, parties had a reason to rely on the guidelines in preparing their
arguments for the purpose of seeking a particular sentence. 501 U.S. at 138-39. Therefore,
in order to enable parties to fairly address the possibility of a sentence that exceeded the
USSC guidelines, sentencing courts were required to give advance notice of any intent to
exceed the guideline range. Id.
260. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 712.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 713.
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notice in Burns. Indeed, a sentence outside the Guidelines carries no
presumption of unreasonableness.",2 " Thus, while sentencing courts
are still required to give parties an opportunity to prepare for and
address unresolved sentencing concerns, no specific notice regarding the
risk of a higher-than-recommended sentence is required, and relief may
not be sought on that grounds that such notice is not given.26
The Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Oregon v. Ice265 marked the
first significant post-Booker limitation on the right to trial by jury.26 6
In Ice, respondent Thomas Ice had been convicted in Oregon after, on
two separate occasions, he illegally entered an apartment in a housing
complex he managed and, while there, sexually assaulted an elevenyear-old girl. The state charged and convicted Ice on six different
counts, including two counts each of burglary with intent to commit
sexual abuse, sexual assault by touching the victim's genitals, and
sexual assault by touching the victim's breasts. A separate tenet of
Oregon law required sentencing courts to impose, by default, concurrent
sentences on defendants who were convicted of multiple crimes
simultaneously, unless the sentencing court made additional findings,
including, for example, that the offenses arose out of separate courses of
conduct, indicated a willingness to commit additional crimes, or created
an exceptional risk of harm to the victim or others. Applying these laws
at sentencing, the judge found that each burglary was a separate course
of conduct, and that Ice met the other statutory qualifications for
consecutive sentences with respect to each of the sexual assault counts.
With these findings, Ice was sentenced to 28 years and 4 months in
prison, up from a possible sentence of 7.5 years if the judge had ordered
concurrent sentences.267
Ice appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that, because a
judge and not a jury decided that Ice had met the statutory qualifications for consecutive sentencing, the judge had effectively found "fact[s]
that increase[d] the penalty for [his] crime[s] beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum" and that, under Apprendi, those findings of fact
"must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 68 The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with Ice, reasoning that
"the imposition of consecutive sentences increased the quantum of

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 714-16 & n.2.
555 U.S. 160 (2009).
See id. at 172.
Id. at 165-66 & n.5.
Id. at 166-67 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
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punishment imposed."26 9 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.270
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court traced its reasoning from
Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham back to the common law
origins of the right to trial by jury.271 In doing so, it held that the
difference in the sentencing procedures between those cases and Ice's
case was that the right to determine the facts of a case "was understood
as within 'the domain of the jury . . . by those who framed the Bill of
Rights,"' while the choice of imposing concurrent or consecutive
sentences traditionally "rested exclusively with the judge."2 12 Because
of this traditional division of labor, the Court held that Ice was not
entitled to have the facts that permitted consecutive sentencing to be
found by a jury, even though state law made concurrent sentencing the
default absent the specific finding of such facts. 273 The Court went on
to hold that finding otherwise would impede upon states' sovereign
authority to legislatively address crime as each state felt appropriate.274 Thus, it reasoned, extending the Sixth Amendment to encompass a legislative regulation of concurrent sentencing could also extend
the right to trial by jury to the great range of other sentence-related
decisions judges have traditionally made, such as the imposition or
extent of supervised release, community service, fines, or restitution.27 5
Therefore, the relief that the Oregon Supreme Court granted to Ice was
reversed.276
Just one week after deciding Ice, the Supreme Court issued its second
opinion in Spears v. United States,2 77 returning to issues and facts
nearly identical to those presented in Kimbrough and issuing a
summary, per curiam opinion reversing the Eighth Circuit's holding
In Spears, the United States
without hearing oral argument.7
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa convicted Steven Spears
of conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and at least
500 grams of cocaine HCl. Based on his criminal history, the USSG
recommended sentence for Spears was between 27 years and 33 years,

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
Justice

Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 168 (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002)).
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170-72.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
555 U.S. 261 (2009).
See id. at 262-68. The lack of oral argument is noted in a statement made by
Kennedy as part of the opinion. See id. at 268.
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9 months in prison. However, the sentencing court issued findings that
the 100:1 crack sentencing disparity resulted in a sentence that was
excessive under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors analysis. In an effort to
alleviate some of the disparity, the court instead applied a 20:1 ratio to
the facts of Spears's case, which led to a new guidelines range of 17.5
years to 21 years, 10 months. Finding the statutory mandatory
minimum adequate, the court sentenced Spears to 20 years' imprisonment.279
The Government appealed the sentence to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that it was error for the
sentencing court to "categorically reject U the 100:1 quantity ratio and
substitut[e] its own ratio in calculating Spears's sentence."280 The
Supreme Court granted Spears's first petition for writ of certiorari,
summarily vacated the Eighth Circuit's ruling, and remanded with
instruction to reconsider the case in light of Kimbrough.2 81 On remand, the Eighth Circuit reached the exact same conclusion that it had
reached previously, for the exact same reasons.28 2 "Because the Eighth
Circuit's decision on remand conflict[ed] with [the Supreme Court's]
decision in Kimbrough, [the Court] grant[ed Spears's] petition for
certiorari and reverseld].
In reapplying Kimbrough, the Court held that "the point of Kimbrough
[was to recognize] district courts' authority to vary from the crack
cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not
simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an
excessive sentence in a particular case.n2 1 In driving home the point,
the Court went on to say that the latter part of that statement, that
sentencing courts had authority to make individualized determinations
that a sentence under the USSG would be excessive, had been decided
all the way back in Booker."' Not only that, but the Court also
highlighted the fact that the same point had been conceded by the
Government in arguing Kimbrough, and the holding in Kimbrough
plainly recognized that the discretion afforded to sentencing courts when
presiding over crack cases reached beyond even the broad discretionary
augmentation created in Booker.286 Finally, with the holding in

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 262 (quoting United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1174 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 262-63 (citing Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090 (2008)).
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 264-65.
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Kimbrough clarified for the Eighth Circuit, the Court again reversed the
Eighth Circuit's holding and remanded for further proceedings.28 7
The October 2009 Term of Court presented the Supreme Court with
its first opportunity to consider the procedural requirements of
sentencing reduction hearings after a 2008 USSG amendment recommended retroactively decreasing sentences for crack cocaine offenses.28
In Dillon v. United States,' Percy Dillon was serving a sentence of 26
years, 10 months in prison for his 1993 conviction on numerous counts
of crack and powder cocaine trafficking, as well as one count of using a
firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking offense. At his sentencing
hearing, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania found that Dillon had controlled 1.5 kilograms of crack as
well as 1.6 kilograms of cocaine HC1. This resulted in a base offense
level of 38 for Dillon's drug offenses, plus a mandatory consecutive 5year sentence for the firearms offense.2 90 Because the USSG were
mandatory at the time, the sentencing court sentenced Dillon to the
minimum within the guidelines range, commenting at the time that the
sentence was "entirely too high for the crime [Dillon] committed."9
When the USSC retroactively applied an across-the-board, two-level
reduction in the base offense levels of crack offenses in 2008, Dillon filed
an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(cX2)29 2 motion seeking a modification of his
sentence.2 " At his motion hearing, Dillon argued for a further reduction below the new guidelines range, "[blased largely on his postsentencing conduct, including his determined pursuit of educational and
The district court granted
community-outreach opportunities." 294
Dillon's motion, but only reduced his sentence to 22.5 years, the
minimum under the new guidelines recommendation. The court
reasoned that, while Booker rendered advisory the Guidelines' recommendations in federal sentencing hearings, the directives governing postsentencing adjustments based on § 3582(c)(2) motions were still
Therefore, when the USSG themselves permit a
mandatory. 295
retroactive reduction in the sentences of prisoners filing proper

287. Id. at 266-68 ("[W~e should therefore promptly remove from the menu the Eighth
Circuit's offering, a smuggled-in dish that is indigestible.").
288. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010).
289. 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010).
290. Id. at 2689.
291. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
293. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2689.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2689-90.
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§ 3582(c)(2) motions, USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)... also limits the extent of
the sentence reduction available.2 "' This limitation requires that
the court shall not reduce the defendant's term of imprisonment ... to
a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range
. . . [unless] the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term
of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the
defendant at the time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion
to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, [in
which case] a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline
range.

. .

may be appropriate.298

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
decision, reiterating the district court's position that the sentencing
reduction provisions of the USSG were still mandatory. 99
The Supreme Court agreed. 0 0 It held that § 3582(c)(2) entitled a
prisoner to a modification of an already-imposed final sentence and not
a resentencing de novo.30 This narrow interpretation of § 3582(c)(2)
required courts hearing sentence modification motions to follow a strict
two-step analysis.ao2 First, the court must figure out whether the
USSC has explicitly allowed for the retroactive application of a
sentencing guidelines amendment under USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2), and only
then does the court conduct an analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors to determine what would constitute a new, fair sentence in light
of the new guidelines recommendation.0 With this preliminary issue
out of the way, the Court went on to hold that, because § 3582(c)(2) only
applies in limited circumstances and does not grant the prisoner a
plenary resentencing, § 3582(c)(2) is not under the same constitutional
constraints as the entire USSG sentencing process was pre-Booker.3 *
Therefore, the Court held that the limitation imposed by § 3582(c)(2) was
binding such that courts cannot modify a within-guidelines sentence to
become a below-guidelines sentence under the newly applicable
guidelines range."o

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(2) (2011).

See id.
Id.
Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2690.
Id. at 2694.
Id. at 2690-91.
Id. at 2691.
Id. at 2691-92.
Id. at 2692.
Id.
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3.2011: Justice Sotomayor Defines Term "Wide Discretion." In
its most recent term, the Supreme Court decided yet another case in the
Apprendi-Booker line, Pepper v. United States,30 in which the Court
made a fine distinction between different kinds of sentencing procedures.30 ' Given the narrow interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) motions for
reduction of sentence under Dillon, some may have found it surprising
that the Court held just 9 months later in Pepper that district courts
could enjoy wide discretion with respect to resentencing when a
defendant's sentence had been vacated on appeal.3 o This is especially
true given that the opinions in both Dillon and Pepper were penned by
Justice Sotomayor.aos
In Pepper, the petitioner, Jason Pepper, had pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. As
part of his plea deal, Pepper also turned two of his co-conspirators over
to police and agreed to testify about their criminal activities before a
federal grand jury. At his initial sentencing hearing, the Government
acknowledged Pepper's substantial assistance in their investigation and
moved for a 15% downward departure from the sentencing guideline
range of 97 to 121 months' imprisonment. Instead, the district court
sentenced Pepper to 24 months' imprisonment, or about 75% below the
minimum recommended USSG sentence.3 10 The Government appealed
the sentence to the Eighth Circuit, which vacated the sentence in light
of the intervening Booker case. Pepper then completed his original
sentence just days later, and he was freed on supervised release.
A resentencing hearing took place in May 2006, at which Pepper
testified regarding his successful completion of the prison's 500-hour
drug abuse program, his complete rehabilitation from drug dependence,
his reconciliation with estranged family members, his enrollment and
success at a local college, and his steady employment since being
released from prison. Acknowledging the command of the Eighth
Circuit, the court limited the downward sentencing departure for
assisting authorities to only 40%. However, the court also made special
findings that Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation entitled him to an

306. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
307. See id. at 1241.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 1235; Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2687.
310. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236 & nn.1-2. The sentencing judge chose a 24-month
sentence because that was the minimum sentence that a prisoner could serve in the
assigned federal prison while still qualifying for the prison's intensive drug abuse
treatment program. See United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2005).
311. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236.
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additional downward departure of 59% and reinstated the already-served
24-month sentence. The Government again appealed, and the Eighth
Circuit vacated the sentence once more, holding that a 59% downward
departure was an abuse of discretion.3 1 2 Pepper petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the petition, along with a summary
reversal and remand in light of the holding in Gall concerning the use
of percentages in determining the unreasonableness of guidelines
departures."'3
On remand, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Pepper's case from Gall,
holding that, without reference to the percent of the downward
departure, it was nonetheless inappropriate for the sentencing court to
have considered Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts in his
new resentencing hearing. Thus, Pepper returned again to the district
court in 2008 for his third sentencing hearing, this time before a new
judge. At this third sentencing, the district court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit's position that a 40% downward departure for cooperating with
authorities was excessive and that Pepper deserved no consideration for
his post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts, despite the fact that, by this
time, Pepper was a supervisor at his job, and had married and was
raising a child. The district court sentenced Pepper to 65 months'
imprisonment, and he was remanded into federal custody. Pepper
appealed the new sentence, claiming, among other things, that the
sentencing court erred by failing to consider his post-sentencing
rehabilitation efforts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the new sentence and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari yet again.1
The Court began by addressing the claim that it was error for the
sentencing court to fail to consider Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation.1 5 By recalling the old adage that "punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime," the Court held that
both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 16

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1236-38.
1238 (citing Pepper v. United States, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008)).
1238-39.
1239-40.
1240 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949)).
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This reaffirmed the traditional breadth of discretion and judgment long
enjoyed by sentencing courts.31 The Court then referred back to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984"3 -which had originally created the
USSC and ordered the establishment of the USSG' 19-and noted that
the guidelines themselves explicitly permitted sentencing judges to
consider any kind of information from any legal source.320
This highlights the stark difference between Pepper and Dillon. In
Dillon, the Court held that a sentence modification proceeding was
constrained by mandatory limitations on available reductions in
sentences, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) "fair sentencing" factors were
secondary to the determination that a sentence modification was even
available.3 21 In contrast, Pepper expressly held that, in a plenary
resentencing, the fairness factors of § 3553(a) were the primary
consideration of courts and any lawfully available information under the
sun could be weighed in reaching any legal sentence, no matter how far
below the advisory guidelines the sentence fell, so long as there was no
abuse of discretion.3 22
B. Crack Cocaine Sentencing Outside of Booker: Justice Sotomayor
Defines the Term "Cocaine Base"
As the fates of crack offenders and the United States Sentencing
Commission continue to intertwine, a number of new cases have
appeared on the Supreme Court docket just in the last and current
terms of Court. In the October 2010 term, the Supreme Court decided
two cases relating to crack specifically. The first decision came once
again from Justice Sotomayor, in the June 2011 case DePierre v. United
States."3 At issue in DePierre was the legal definition of the term
"cocaine base. 324 Petitioner Frantz DePierre had been charged with
distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base after he sold the
drugs to a government informant. At trial, a chemist working for the
government testified that the substance, which DePierre had sold,
weighed 55.1 grams and contained cocaine base. However, the chemist
was unable to conclude that the substance had any baking soda (sodium

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See id.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat. at 2017.
See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240.
Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691-92.
Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-43.
131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011).
Id. at 2227-28.
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bicarbonate) in it, and was therefore unable to determine whether it was
actually crack cocaine or some other form of cocaine base.325
At trial, DePierre argued that the jury could not convict him under the
"cocaine base" statute unless it could be proven that the substance was,
in fact, crack cocaine. Along with his argument, DePierre submitted two
proposed jury instructions: one which gave the definition of "crack" as
laid out in the USSG, and one which instructed the jury that the
chemical identification of crack depended on the detection of (the
unfound) sodium bicarbonate in the substance. Instead, the court
instructed the jury that the relevant statute only specifies that it is
illegal to distribute "cocaine base," and therefore, evidence that the
substance was cocaine base, though not necessarily crack, was legally
sufficient to support a conviction. The jury convicted DePierre and the
court sentenced him to the then-minimum statutory sentence of 10 years
in prison."' The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, noting the deep
circuit split between circuits where "cocaine base" was defined solely as
meaning "crack cocaine" and those defining the term to include any form
of cocaine base."'
The Supreme Court defined the term "cocaine base" by first turning
to the relevant statutory language.'
In 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), 329
a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence is required for offenses
involving
5 kilograms or more of... coca leaves,

..

.

cocaine, its salts, optical

and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers[,] ... ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers[,] or ... any compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the
[above] substances . . . [or] . . . 50 grams or more of a mixture or

substance described [above] which contains cocaine base.33 0

325. Id. at 2230; see supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the manufacturing process of crack cocaine).
326. DePierre, 131 S. Ct. at 2230.
327. Id. at 2230-31; see also United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25,30-31 & nn.3-4 (1st
Cir. 2010) (noting that "cocaine base" is defined as only meaning "crack" or "crack and
other types of smokable cocaine base" in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and D.C. circuits,
while the term is interpreted to include any form of cocaine base in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
5th, and 10th circuits).
328. See DePierre, 131 S. Ct. at 2231.
329. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
330. Id. Note that § 841 was amended by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, raising from
50 grams to 280 grams the threshold quantity of cocaine base-containing substance
required to trigger the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372.
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The Court found that the "most natural reading of the term 'cocaine
base' [was] 'cocaine in its base form' . . . the molecule found in crack
cocaine, freebase, and coca paste."33 ' Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that the term "cocaine base" was redundant in that chemically
pure cocaine is, by definition, chemically basic." The Court explained
this redundancy by noting that the term "cocaine",is traditionally used
to refer either to all substances containing cocaine in any form, or just
Therefore, while technically
to cocaine HCl (powdered cocaine).3 "
redundant, the Court held that the additional word "base" served to
disambiguate forms of cocaine including crack, freebase, and coca paste
from those forms such as powdered cocaine, which Congress sought to
punish less harshly.3
In its opinion, the Court also addressed, but dismissed, additional
arguments, including DePierre's invocation of the legislative intent in
passing the 100:1 sentencing ratio in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986.33s First, DePierre claimed that Congress passed the Act in
response to a specific legislative concern about the dangerousness of
crack cocaine, as opposed to cocaine base generally.3 6 However, the
Court held that this was not necessarily so because the discussions about
the dangerousness of crack cocaine focused on the fact that crack allowed
the drug to be inhaled-a method of use that is also available with other
Second, DePierre
forms of cocaine base, but not cocaine HCl."
asserted that the inclusive definition of "cocaine base" led to absurd
results because 5 grams of raw coca leaves, which allegedly contained
.05 grams of smokable cocaine base, would therefore be subject to the
same minimum sentence as 5 grams of purified, smokable crack
cocaine.3 38 The Court held that the explicit inclusion of coca leaves in
the higher-threshold sections of the statute indicated that Congress
meant for crimes involving coca leaves to be punished under the higher
thresholds, even if they might contain cocaine in its chemically basic
Third, DePierre asserted that, since 1993, the USSG
form. 3'
themselves had explicitly defined "cocaine base" to mean "crack."340

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

DePierre,131 S.
Id. at 2232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2235-36.
Id. at 2236.

Ct. at 2231.
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The Court also found this argument unpersuasive because the USSC, in
making that statement in the guidelines, did not purport to be interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), and because the guidelines did not serve to
modify the statutory minimum sentences, but only created some
intermediate quantity thresholds within the confines of the statutory
scheme.341 Thus, the Court fully adopted the broader definition of
"cocaine base" as meaning more than just "crack cocaine," and affirmed
DePierre's conviction.4 2
Just two weeks after deciding DePierre,the Court decided Freeman v.
United States,3 43 which, like Dillon, concerned a crack offender seeking
to take advantage of the retroactive sentencing reductions offered by the
2008 amendment to the USSG. 3" In 2005 a grand jury charged
William Freeman with "various crimes, including possessing with intent
to distribute cocaine base."345 Freeman entered into an agreement in
which he pleaded guilty to all charges in exchange for a government
recommendation that he receive the minimum sentence under the USSG,
as they existed at the time. 6 Then, in 2008, the USSC amended the
USSG so that its recent amendments, which lowered the offense levels
of all crack-related offenses by two, would be retroactive. Shortly
thereafter, Freeman filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), seeking,
However, the United
as in Dillon, a reduction in his sentence. 4
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied
Freeman's motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial on the grounds that defendants who enter into plea agreements which specify a particular
sentence are not eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). 348
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit without
Rather, Justice Kennedy wrote the
issuing a majority opinion."
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, with

341. Id. at 2236-37.
342. Id. at 2237.
343. 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).
344. See id. at 2691-92 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
345. Id. at 2691.
346. Id. The district court sentenced Freeman to 106 months' imprisonment, including
46 months for his drug and other offenses, as well as a mandatory consecutive 60 months
for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Id.
347. Id. at 2691-92; see also Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2689. As a result of the USSG
amendments, Freeman's sentence was now the maximum sentence under the newlyapplicable guidelines range, and a reduction back to the minimum of the new range would
have given Freeman reprieve from 9 months of his sentence. See Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at
2691.
348. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
349. See id. at 2690.
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Justice Sotomayor concurring in the judgment only,35 0 and the remaining Justices dissenting."s' The plurality reasoned that the sentencing
guidelines give judges "a basis ... for the judge's exercise of discretion,"
and that, while a judge will usually "impose a sentence within the
range[, elven where the judge varies from the recommended range, if the
judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the
decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense a
basis for the sentence."35 2 Next, the plurality reasoned that, while the
portion of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing plea
agreements3 3 makes a recommended sentence in such an agreement
binding upon the court once the agreement is accepted, the judicial act
of accepting a plea itself requires the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the agreement in light of the USSG."
Thus, because a
retroactive amendment to the USSG operates "to isolate whatever
marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant's
sentence," a prisoner should be able to invoke § 3582(c)(2) for the
purpose of seeking relief as "to whatever extent the sentencing range in
question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used
to determine the sentence or to approve the [plea] agreement."as5
In reaching its conclusions, the plurality rejected the Government's
position that, when a plea agreement includes a recommended sentence,
which is accepted and imposed by a sentencing court, then the only basis
for the sentence imposed would be the agreement itself, without
reference to the USSG.3 5' However, because the district court must
refer to the USSG in order to evaluate the offered plea agreement, and
because a later sentence reduction proceeding is subject to great
constraint (including under Dillon), the plurality held that the Government's position was not only untenable, but that the Government's fear
that § 3582(c)(2) would be subject to abuse was unfounded.5
In concurring in the judgment only, Justice Sotomayor took a different
perspective with respect to the relationship between a plea agreement
that recommends a sentence and the imposition of that sentence by a
sentencing judge.'
She wrote that the sentencing guidelines only
serve as a basis for a defendant's sentence if the guidelines were used by
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

See id.
See id. at 2700 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2692 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 2692-93.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2693-95.
See id. at 2695-96 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the parties in agreeing upon a sentence to recommend to the court as
Because the district court has only two
part of the plea deal.'
options-in effect, take it or leave it-any reference to the sentencing
guidelines made by the court only serves as a basis for accepting or
rejecting the agreement, and not as a basis for the sentence itself...
To support her position, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that parties in
future plea agreements can help ensure the retroactive reducibility of
their sentences by including a specific clause in the agreement stating
that the sentence was based on the USSG.a1 On the other hand,
prosecutors can ensure that a particular defendant serves out his full
sentence by including in the plea agreement a waiver of the right to
bring a § 3582(c)(2) motion in the event that one of his or her crimes of
conviction are later the subject of a retroactive reduction in sentence.6 Finally, because the plea agreement at issue in this case did
make specific reference to the range recommended in the USSG, Justice
Sotomayor wrote that Freeman had qualified for a sentence reduction
under her analysis.6
The period from 2005 through 2010 saw the parallel histories of the
USSG and federal crack sentencing policies continue to intertwine.
However, the story of the complex relationship between these areas of
law is far from over. Though federal crack sentencing policies changed
significantly between 2005 and 2010, the litigation relating to those
changes seems likely to continue for a long time.
IV.

FUTURE OF THE ISSUE

Cases Currently Pending in the Supreme Court
For the October 2011 term, the Supreme Court has already granted
certiorari in one more "crack" case,"' as well as in another case which
will extend the Apprendi"'-Booker366 line of cases."' In fact, both

A.

359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 2697-98.
362. Id. at 2699.
363. Id. at 2699-2700.
364. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 759 (2011),grantingcert. in United States
v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir., 2011) and Hill v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 759 (2011).
Fisher and Hill were consolidated for this appeal. See id. The Supreme Court made a
decision in Dorsey on June 21, 2012.
365. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
366. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
367. See Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011). The Supreme
Court made a decision in Southern Union on June 21, 2012.
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petitions for certiorari were granted on the same day, November 28,
The "crack" case comes as a consolidated appeal from two
2011.'
separate cases, both out of the Seventh Circuit, United States v.
7 o In Fisher, which was itself a
Fisher36 9 and United States v. Hill.a
consolidated appeal, two defendants sought to convince the Seventh
Circuit that their respective sentencing courts had erred in failing to
sentence them under the reduced sentences of the Fair Sentencing Act
of 2010 (FSA).3 ' The first, Anthony Fisher, had pleaded guilty in
February 2010, before the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine.372
While Fisher disputed the quantity of crack involved, all agreed that it
had exceeded the 50 gram threshold for triggering a mandatory 10-year
minimum sentence, which is what Fisher received. The court sentenced
Fisher on June 2, 2010, and he appealed on June 3, 2010, with his
appeal thus pending when the FSA took effect on August 3, 2010.373
The second defendant, Edward Dorsey, pleaded guilty on June 3,2010,
in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, to
possessing 5.5 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Under
the pre-FSA sentencing scheme, in light of a prior drug conviction
Dorsey had, the mandatory minimum sentence was 10 years' imprisonment. However, at the time of Dorsey's sentencing, the FSA had already
gone into effect (where it had not in Fisher's case), and new criminal
defendants who were similarly situated would only have been subject to
such a sentence if they had possessed at least 28 grams of crack cocaine.
Nonetheless, when Dorsey sought the lower FSA sentence at his
sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that, because his criminal act
was committed in 2008, Dorsey was not entitled to the benefit of the new
legislation. In addition to Fisher's claim that the FSA should be
generally retroactive, Dorsey argued on appeal that, because the FSA
dealt specifically with sentencing, the question of retroactivity should
only be applied to those sentenced after August 3, 2010, and not those
whose criminal conduct occurred thereafter. Therefore, it was Dorsey's
position that Congress intended the FSA to take immediate effect as to
all future sentencing, that the FSA was fully applicable to him at the

368. See id.; Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 759.
369. 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom Dorsey v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 759 (2011).
370. 417 F. App'x 560 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom Dorsey v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 759 (2011).
371. Fisher,635 F.3d at 338-39; see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in scatted sections of 21 U.S.C. ch. 13).
372. Fisher, 635 F.3d at 337.
373. Id.
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time of his sentencing, and that he did not need the benefit of a finding
of retroactivity.3 74
The Seventh Circuit first examined the retroactivity argument brought
by both defendants, but found that the claims were barred under 1
U.S.C. § 109,37 which generally says that the repeal of a law does not
end any penalties or liabilities imposed under the repealed law unless
the repealing act specifically says otherwise."' Because the text of the
FSA did not specifically mention granting retroactive relief, none could
Similar reasoning informed the court's disposition of
be had."'
that Congress intended the FSA's immediate effect."
claim
Dorsey's
that
question, the court held that
In addressing
[diebate surrounding the crack cocaine sentencing scheme and the
infamous "100:1 ratio" has been raging for years, and there is strong
rhetoric to be found on either side. The FSA is compromise legislation
and must be viewed as such. Given the long-standing debate surrounding, and high-level congressional awareness of, this issue, we hesitate
to read in by implication anything not obvious in the text of the FSA.
We believe that if Congress wanted the FSA or the guideline amendments to apply to not-yet-sentenced defendants convicted on pre-FSA
conduct, it would have at least dropped a hint to that effect somewhere
in the text of the FSA, perhaps in its charge to the Sentencing
Commission. In other words, if Congress wanted retroactive application
of the FSA, it would have said so.379
In closing, the court expressed its remorse that Fisher and Dorsey were
not entitled to lower sentences, but noted in dicta that a hypothetical
defendant who had been convicted of continuous conduct spanning from
before August 3, 2010 until afterwards "may very well be able to benefit,
at least in part, from the FSA."380
The Seventh Circuit decided Fisher's consolidated companion case,
Hill, less than a month after Fisher and only one day after the parties'
briefs had been submitted.8 ' Appellant Corey Hill was in a situation
very similar to that of Edward Dorsey in Fisher-Hillhad been convicted
in 2009 of possessing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine with intent

374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 338-39.
1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
Fisher,635 F.3d at 338.
Id. (noting that both the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have reached similar results

in similar cases).

378.
379.
380.
381.

See id. at 339-40.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Compare id. at 336, with Hill, 417 F. App'x at 560.
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to distribute.382 However, Hill's sentencing hearing was not until
December 2010, after the FSA had taken effect. At sentencing, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied
Hill the benefit of the FSA on the ground that, as with Dorsey, Hill's
criminal conduct had occurred before the FSA took effect. The sentencing judge did note, however, that, but for the mandatory minimum
sentence, he would have imposed only a 51-month sentence instead of
the 120 months that Hill received. Hill appealed, arguing, again like
Dorsey, that the FSA should have applied to all sentences handed down
after the Act took effect, regardless of the date the criminal conduct
occurred. This would have subjected Hill to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 5, not 10, years in prison.3 " Echoing the Fisher panel, the
court simply recalled that "we recently rejected the same argument in
[Fisher], where we reaffirmed our [prior] holding ... that the Fair
Sentencing Act does not apply retroactively and added that the relevant
date for determining whether the Act applies is the date of the offense
conduct, rather than the date of sentencing."3M
While it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
these two cases, it is particularly interesting that the Court only granted
In fact, Fisher also
Dorsey's and Hill's petitions for certiorari."
petitioned the Court for certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied his
petition.3 86 Hence, it is Dorsey's name, and not Fisher's, that will
appear in the style of the Supreme Court case."' This is interesting
because the only material factual difference between Fisher's case and
the cases of Dorsey and Hill is that Fisher both committed his crime and
received his sentence before the FSA took effect, whereas both Dorsey
and Hill committed their crimes before the FSA, but were not sentenced
until afterward."
This suggests that the Supreme Court will use this case to establish
whether the FSA changed sentencing for all prisoners sentenced after
August 3, 2010, or just for those who committed crimes after that date.
Another parallel between these two cases lies in the fact that the USSC
had retroactively amended the guidelines recommendations for crack
offenses once again, so that all persons previously convicted of crack

382.
383.
384.
385.
United
386.
387.
388.

Hill, 417 F. App'x at 560-61.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Compare Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 759, and Hill, 132 S. Ct. at 759, with Fisher v.
States, 132 S. Ct. 762 (2011) (denying cert.).
Fisher, 132 S. Ct. at 762.
See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 759.
Compare Fisher, 635 F.3d at 338-39, with Hill, 417 F. App'x at 560-61.
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offenses can now take advantage of an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 9
sentence modification. Thus, the difference between Fisher's future
sentence-reduction efforts and those of Dorsey and Hill (if the Supreme
Court agrees with them) will be identical to the differences between the
90 and Pepper91 cases.1 2
However, even if the Court does
Dillono
Hill,
all is not lost. Where Dorsey's
and
Dorsey
not agree with
with intent to distribute was
base
cocaine
of
grams
possession of 5.5
now be a base level 16 offense
it
would
offense,
24
formerly a base level
and, without regard to his other sentencing considerations, Dorsey might
still see a reduction of 3 years or more off of his sentence. 9 Likewise,
Hill's possession of 50 or more grams of crack with intent to distribute
was formerly a base level 30 offense, since reduced to a base offense level
of 26, which could mean a reduction of 4 years or more from his sentence.9
The newest case in the Apprendi-Booker line of cases, Southern Union
Co. v. United States,"' is also currently pending before the Supreme
Court. In Southern Union, a jury in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island convicted a Texas-based natural gas
company of illegally storing spent mercury-sealed gas regulators, as well
as loose mercury and other mercury-contaminated objects in an unsafe
manner within an abandoned gas manufacturing plant in Rhode Island.
The site where Southern Union was storing this mercury was not
regularly staffed, lacked security cameras, had gaps in the surrounding
fence, was frequently vandalized, and was known to the company to be
housing homeless people in one of the sheds on-site." The company
kept the mercury-sealed gas regulators double-bagged in regular plastic
bags and held in "plastic kiddie pools on the floor of the brick build-

389. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
390. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010).
391. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
392. That is, Fisher's future motions for a reduced sentenced would be mandatorily
limited to the new applicable guidelines range, as was the case in Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at
2694, whereas Dorsey and Hill may have the benefit of a plenary resentencing, like in
Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240-43, if the Supreme Court holds in their favor.
393. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2010) (amended 2011)
(old cocaine base offense levels), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1. 1(2011)
(current cocaine base offense levels); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A
(2011) (showing the difference in possible punishments between offense level 24 crimes and
offense level 16 crimes).
394. See sources cited supra note 393.
395. 630 F.3d 17, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011). Note that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both this case and Dorsey on the same day.
396. Southern Union, 630 F.3d at 22.
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ing."397 The company was also storing loose mercury in "a milk jug, a
paint can, glass jars, and plastic containers," as well as other "various
containers in which it arrived."39"
This mercury had accumulated over the course of more than two years,
and eventually amounted to about 1.25 gallons of loose mercury, and 165
mercury-sealed gas regulators. While some employees within the
company made efforts to call attention to the mounting mercury storage
problems at this facility, the company never undertook any actual
cleanup efforts. About two years after the illegal mercury storage began,
a group of local youths broke into the abandoned facility and started
playing with some of the mercury, which they spilled in and around the
building. They also took some mercury back to their apartment complex,
where they played with it outside and threw it into the air. As a result,
the untreated mercury also contaminated several apartments. Southern
Union did not discover the break-in until after about three weeks had
passed, at which point the company immediately brought in a contractor
to clean up the spills, and contacted the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management. Nonetheless, Southern Union spent more
than $6 million cleaning up the contamination, and the entire apartment
complex had to be evacuated for more than two months.'
Despite Southern Union's gross environmental mismanagement, ajury
convicted it of only one count of violating 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d),400 for
storing hazardous liquid mercury waste without a permit.40' By the
terms of the statute, the maximum fine that can be imposed for violating
§ 6928(d) is $50,000 per day of the violation.4 02 However, the indictment under which Southern Union was charged only specified that the
violation occurred "[firom on or about September 19, 2002 until on or
about October 19, 2004," with similar language appearing on the verdict
form. 403 When the jury returned its verdict of guilty, the sentencing
judge interpreted that the jury had found that a continuous violation
throughout the entire named period of time was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 04 As a result, the court calculated that the maximum fine to which Southern Union was subject would be $38.1

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22-24.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2006).
Southern Union, 630 F.3d at 24.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
Southern Union, 630 F.3d at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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million.405 Instead, the court imposed a $6 million fine, as well as an
additional $12 million "community service obligation. "06
Southern Union appealed the sentence, alleging that, because the jury
verdict did not include a specific finding as to the number of days of the
violation, the largest fine that could be imposed by the jury verdict alone
would be the one-day maximum of $50,000. That is, the jury only found
that a violation had occurred at some point, and not over any specific
number of days. Therefore, when the district court interpreted the jury
verdict as meaning that Southern Union had violated the law on each
day within the span given on the verdict form, it was finding additional
facts that operated to increase the maximum sentence beyond that which
was supported by the jury verdict alone. This, they argued, violated
Southern Union's right to trial by jury, as held in the Apprendi-Booker
line of cases.407
The First Circuit began analyzing the claim by reviewing the entire
line of Apprendi-Booker cases. 408 Specifically, the court found it
significant that these cases concerned the right to have a jury find all
facts relevant to "punishment" or "penalties," without addressing any
specific kind of punishment, such as fines, prison sentences, probated
sentences, or any other kind of penalty that a sentencing court might
impose.4 09 However, because of the generality of the language used in
the Apprendi-Booker line of cases, and the fact that all of these cases
have dealt with natural persons, and not corporations, as defendants,
the First Circuit treated the issue as a matter of first impression.4 10
The court then turned to the Government's arguments, which relied on
Oregon v. Ice"n and the historical division between judicial discretion
and the power of the jury.412 The Government held the position that,
because judges traditionally have discretion to set the specific amounts
of fines imposed on criminal defendants, the right to a jury trial does not
protect those facing punitive fines.413
Following the analytical path laid out in Ice, the First Circuit then
noted the Supreme Court's dicta in Ice, which stated that

405.
$50,000
of $38.1
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. The time span in question measured 762 days, which, at a maximum of
in fines per day, would have subjected Southern Union to a maximum total fine
million. Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 21, 33.
555 U.S. 160 (2009).
Southern Union, 630 F.3d at 33.
Id.
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[tirial judges often find facts about the nature of the offense or the
character of the defendant in determining, for example, the length of
supervised release following service of a prison sentence; required
attendance at drug rehabilitation programs or terms of community
service; and the imposition of statutorilyprescribedfines and orders of

restitution."
Next, the First Circuit pointed out that judges, not the jury, traditionally
enjoyed the discretion to set the amount of any fme imposed on a
criminal. 45 Thus, it held that the Apprendi-Booker line of cases does
not apply to criminal fmes.2e The court also recognized that, by
applying Ice to deny those facing criminal fines the increased protection
of the jury, it was creating a circuit split with the United States Courts
of Appeals for both the Second and Seventh Circuits."' Lastly, as a
precaution, the court went on to hold that, if Apprendi does apply to
criminal fines, then the district court erred in presuming that the jury's
verdict found a violation on every day in the range specified in the
indictment, beyond a reasonable doubt.1
As with Dorsey/Hill, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
November 28, 2011.411 It is worth noting that, despite the complex
questions of environmental regulatory law also raised below in Southern
Union, the only issue on certiorari is Southern Union's claim that it is
entitled to jury fact-finding, under Apprendi, with respect to the
duration of the violation.420 Perhaps this is an indication of where
Southern Union's attorneys feel its strongest argument lies. Perhaps
this is an effort to focus the Supreme Court's attention on what Southern
Union considers to be the most important issue for the future of the
business.
In any case, there are some significant policy considerations at stake
with the decision of this appeal. If the Supreme Court holds that
Apprendi does not apply to fines, then that would be equivalent to
holding that it does not apply to any case against a corporate defendant,

414. Id. at 34 (quoting Ice, 555 U.S. at 171) (alteration in original).
415. Id. at 35.
416. Id. at 36.
417. Id. at 36 n.17.
418. Id. at 36-37.
419. Southern Union, 132 S. Ct. at 756.
420. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
756 (2011) (No. 11-94), 2011 WL 2877878, at *I1(stating the sole "Question Presented" as
"Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that this Court established
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, apply to the imposition
of criminal fines.").
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because fines and similar penalties are traditionally the only sentences
imposed on corporations.421 In a way, such a holding would scale back
the degree of "personhood" enjoyed by corporations, because natural
persons would de facto enjoy greater rights as criminal defendants than
corporations. On the other hand, if the Court decides that Apprendi does
apply to fines, then a new question will arise as to where to draw the
line. While Ice held that judges had full discretion with respect to the
question of concurrent or consecutive sentencing, applying Apprendi to
fines might mean that, in coming years, the Supreme Court would have
to individually revisit each of the other traditional judicial provinces
mentioned in Ice, including, for example, "the length of supervised
release following service of a prison sentence; required attendance at
drug rehabilitation programs or terms of community service; and the
imposition of . . . orders of restitution."4 22
B. Possible Matters for the United States Supreme Court to Address
in the Future
While the Supreme Court is deciding Dorsey and Southern Union this
term, there are some potential future issues for the Court currently
brewing in the lower federal courts. For example, the Eighth Circuit
recently issued an unpublished decision in United States v. Duncan.423
In Duncan, a federal grand jury indicted defendant Larita Duncan in
March 2010 for possession of crack cocaine, and she pleaded guilty on
August 24, 2010, to possession of more than 5, but less than 20, grams
of crack.4' At sentencing, on November 22, 2010, Duncan received the
mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment under the preFSA version of the USSG. 4 2 5 At her sentencing hearing, Duncan
argued that the FSA should apply to her retroactively and that she
should not be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence.4 2 6
The Eighth Circuit, relying on its own precedent, rejected Duncan's
claim.
In doing so, however, the court noted that it was splitting
with the First Circuit, which had recently affirmed a case upholding the
proposition that Congress intended the FSA to affect all crack sentencing

421. See Southern Union, 630 F.3d at 33.
422. Ice, 555 U.S. at 171.
423. 449 F. App'x 531 (8th Cir. 2011).
424. Brief of Appellee, United States v. Duncan, 449 F. App'x 531 (8th Cir. 2011) (No.
10-3737), 2011 WL 585552, at *i.
425. Duncan, 449 F. App'x at 532.
426. Id.
427. Id.
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that took place after its effective date.12' Finding that Congress could
have simply said so in the text of the statute if it had intended for the
FSA to apply retroactively, the Eighth Circuit then held that it was not
authorized to impute such a meaning to the statute on its own.4 ' 9 The
Eighth Circuit's action in this case was particularly surprising in light
of the fact that this decision came out after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Dorsey and Hill.4 30 In fact, the court even acknowledged
the certiorari grants in a footnote. 3 '
Given the narrow scope of the issue in Dorsey and Hill, this decision
effectively amounts to the Eighth Circuit's re-voicing its vote among
those opposing holdings already made by other circuit courts. 432 In an
opinion concurring in the judgment only, Circuit Judge Kermit Bye even
details the extent of the circuit split, stating that the First, Third, and
Eleventh Circuits have applied the FSA with respect to all sentencing
taking place after the law's enactment, while the Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits share the Eighth Circuit's position.433 He then writes
of his personal agreement with those circuits that have applied the FSA
to all sentences following its enactment, but "reluctantly concur [s]" with
the panel's "absurd result" because the decision was bound under circuit
precedent.434
Another question that divides the circuit courts is the issue of whether
offenders sentenced under the career offender provisions of the USSG for
crack-related offenses are at all eligible for sentence reductions under
the new, post-FSA, guideline amendments.'
The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit answered that question in the 2011
case United States v. Rivera.'" In 1996, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut convicted Gilberto Rivera of a crime
involving roughly 3.3 kilograms (7.26 pounds) of crack cocaine.3 7 At
the time, the highest offense level that the USSG assigned for a crack
violation was a base offense level of 38, given for crimes involving 1.5

428. See id. (citing United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Me. 2010), affd
644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011)).
429. Id.
430. See id. at 532 n.2.
431. Id.
432. See generally id. at 532-34 (majority opinion and Bye, C.J., concurring).
433. Id. at 533 (Bye, C.J., concurring).
434. Id. at 532-34.
435. See United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 178-84 (2d. Cir. 2011) (gathering and
comparing cases from various circuits).
436. 662 F.3d 166 (2d. Cir. 2011).
437. Id. at 168.
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kilograms of crack or more.438 Rivera's prior convictions initially
qualified him for a criminal history category of IV, and the combination
of a level 38 offense and a category IV offender would have yielded a
sentence of between 324 and 405 months in prison. However, given the
nature of Rivera's past offenses, the court reclassified him as a "career
offender."""
Under USSG § 4B1.1,440 one qualifies as a "career offender" if three
conditions are met."1 First, the defendant must have been over
eighteen years old at the commission of the crime being sentenced;
second, the crime in question must have been a felony involving either
violence or a controlled substance; and third, the defendant must have
had at least two prior felony convictions that were either crimes of
violence or controlled substance violations.4 2 Thus, the "career
offender" categorization works on a sort of "three strikes" model, with a
strong possibility of increased punishment for those found to fit its
requirements. Once a court designates a person as being a career
offender, the court then applies two modifications to the sentencing
calculations. 443 First, the court automatically increases the defendant's
criminal history category to VI, which is the highest possible category.4 " Then, the court increases the defendant's offense level based on
the statutory maximum sentence for the crime to be punished, except
where the non-career-offender offense level already equals or exceeds
this heightened offense level."
Typically, this has the effect of
assigning a defendant a new category and offense level, without
reference to the original offense level.446
For Rivera, the offense level for his crime of conviction, at 38, already
exceeded the maximum offense level of 37 given by the career offender
guideline; therefore, at Rivera's sentencing, the career offender
designation only affected his criminal history category.447 Still, this
raised his possible sentencing range to between 30 years and life
imprisonment. As a last consideration, though, the sentencing judge
gave Rivera a three-level downward departure because of Rivera's poor

438. U.S. SENTENCING GUDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1995) (amended 2011),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ Guidelines/1995_guidelines/Manual/CH2PTD.htm.
439. Rivera, 662 F.3d at 168-69.
440. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

4B1.1 (2011).

441. Id.
442. Id. at § 4B1.1(a).
443. Id. at § 4B1.1(b).
444. Id.
445. Id.

446. See id. at § 4B1.1, cmt. background, p. 397 (2011).
447. Rivera, 662 F.3d at 169-70.
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mental health history, sentencing him to the guidelines' minimum
sentence of 292 months in prison. Following the 2008 amendment to the
USSG, retroactively reducing all crack-related offenses by two offense
levels, Rivera filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of sentence.
However, the district court found that the "applicable guideline range"
under which Rivera had been sentenced was the career offender range,
which had not been retroactively reduced, as opposed to the cocaine base
guideline range, which had. Therefore, the district court denied Rivera's
motion, and he appealed to the Second Circuit.44 8
In approaching the question of whether Rivera was eligible for a
sentence reduction, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that the
statute that allows for a reduction only makes that allowance if the
defendant was sentenced "based on a sentencing range that has
Similarsubsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission."
ly, the USSG themselves limit the availability of sentence reductions to
prisoners for whom "the guideline range applicableto that defendant has
subsequently been lowered."'SO However, because the retroactive
sentence reductions granted in 2008 only referred to the guidelines
governing controlled substance violations, and not to the career offender
guidelines, these phrases quoted by the court established a critical
threshold question.'" That is, if the "applicable guideline range" that
the sentence was "based on" was the career offender guideline, and not
the cocaine base guideline, then Rivera was not even eligible for
consideration for a sentencing reduction because his applicable range
had not been reduced.4 52 In fact, the court even pointed out that when
the only sentencing consideration was that someone was a career
offender, with no downward departures, ten circuit courts of appeals
have held that a reduction in crack sentencing guidelines does not make
a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction available.
The court then noted that, when a sentencing judge identifies the fact
that someone qualifies as a career offender, but then explicitly sets aside
the career offender guidelines and imposes a sentence using the
guidelines range for the crime of conviction, the circuits are deeply
divided as to whether such a sentencing is still "based on" the career

448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
See Rivera, 662 F.3d at 171-72.
Id.
Id. at 172 & n.4.

MANUAL

§ 1B1.10(a)(1) (2011).
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45 4
offender guidelines or the guidelines for the crime of conviction.
Ultimately, the court held that, because of the downward departure to
account for Rivera's mental health issues, this was unlike the situation
where a defendant was sentenced directly based on the career offender
guidelines, and also unlike the case where a career offender was
5
explicitly sentenced under the guidelines for the crime of conviction.
Thus, the court had to decide what guideline range Rivera's sentence
was based on, since he was a crack offender who qualified as a career
offender, but was subsequently given a downward departure from the
career offender guidelines. 45' To complicate the question, the judge
who sentenced Rivera made no mention of either the career offender
guidelines or the cocaine base guidelines with respect to the final
sentence, and the sentence ultimately imposed was lower than what
would have been suggested by either set of rules.4 57
To resolve this question, the court of appeals looked to a number of
factors, including the USSC's purpose for revising the guidelines, the
rule of lenity, and an inquiry into the definition of the terms "applicable"
After a "cogent and scholarly" 9 analysis, the
and "based on.""
court concluded that the sentence was "based on" the guideline range
that was ultimately imposed, and not on either the career offender range
or that of the crime of conviction. 4 0 From there, the court held that,
though the post-departure career offender range had not been retroactively reduced by the 2008 USSG amendment, it was sufficient that a
lower sentence would result for Rivera if the guidelines that had been
reduced were in effect and used at his initial sentencing. 461 Because
the USSC adjusted the maximum cocaine base offense level to only
include offenses involving 4.5 kilograms or more of cocaine, Rivera would
have initially had a base offense level of 36, and not 38, under the new
The career offender rules would have increased this to
guidelines.'
a level 37 and, with Rivera's three-level mental health reduction, he
would have ended up at level 34, not level 35, meaning that the

454. See id. at 172 n.5 (noting that the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits have held that
such defendants are eligible for a sentence reduction, while the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion).
455. Id. at 172-73.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 173.
458. Id. at 172-77.
459. Id. at 187 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring).
460. Id. at 177 (majority opinion).
461. Id. at 182-83.
462. Id. at 174 n.7.
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63
minimum possible sentence would have been 30 months shorter.
Because the court found that the cocaine base sentencing reductions
were intended to correct unjust sentences, the court held that, where
plugging in the new guidelines and following the same logic used by the
sentencing judge leads to a new result, then a defendant is eligible for
a sentence reduction.6
Lastly, the court mentioned that the USSC had promulgated a
proposed amendment to the USSG that would make the post-FSA
guidelines revisions retroactive and clarify the definition of "applicable
guidelines range" for sentence modification hearings.4 65 The court
noted that, under the new USSG definition of "applicable guidelines
range," the relevant guideline has become the guideline used as a
starting point, before any departures are granted. 4 " The court also
pointed out that, had that new amendment been in effect when Rivera
first sought his sentence modification, then he would have been
completely barred from receiving any modification because it would be
the career offender guidelines, and not cocaine base guidelines, that
courts would have to look to for retroactive resentencing.4 67
While the USSC intended this new amendment to resolve the circuit
split discussed in Rivera, this change has already created new problems
in the few short months since it took effect.4 68 In fact, one district
court, in United States v. Ware,4 " has already held that, despite the
Rivera court's apprehensions, the new definition of "applicable guidelines
range" does not preclude a court from reducing the sentence of a
defendant in a situation very similar to that in Rivera.470 In Ware, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
convicted defendant Andre Ware in 2009 of, inter alia, of possessing 1.17
grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a
school. Ware had an extensive criminal history and qualified as a career
offender. But, because of the tiny quantity of crack involved, the
sentencing judge determined that the career offender guidelines range
of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment was far too large. Instead, the

463. Id. at 174.
464. Id. at 175-77.
465. See id. at 183 (referring to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. III,
amend. 759 (2011), which was pending subject to congressional approval at the time Rivera
was decided, but which took effect on Nov. 1, 2011).
466. Id. at 183-84.
467. Id. at 183.
468. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C, vol. III, amend. 759, at 421
(discussing reasons for the amendment).
469. No. 08-625-01, 2012 WL 38937 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2012).
470. Id. at *6.
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judge departed from the career offender range and sentenced Ware to
double the midpoint of the guidelines range for his crimes of conviction,
which resulted in a sentence of 128 months in prison.
After USSG Amendment 759472 passed, Ware filed a § 3582(cX2)
motion for a reduced sentence.473 In considering Ware's motion, the
district court ruled that the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 3582(c)(2) in Freeman v. United States47 4 took precedent over the new USSG
definition of "applicable guidelines range." 7 The court also held that
the policy considerations behind the retroactive reduction of crack
sentences likewise reinforced the idea that, despite the revised definition
of "applicable guidelines range," it was still appropriate to grant Ware's
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. 476 Therefore, while the USSC's recent amendments may have attempted to resolve the circuit split discussed in
Rivera, that resolution may be short-lived as it appears that the issue
may, at least for the time being, still be very much alive.

V.

CONCLUSION

Though the United States Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines
Manual both have a long and complicated relationship with federal crack
cocaine sentencing policies, there is little indication of that relationship
losing its aptitude for producing complex and interesting litigation in the
coming years. This is an area that the Supreme Court continues to be
actively involved in, and the Author is interested to see not only how the
Court decides the two cases on its current docket, but also whether the
circuit splits discussed above might soon be picked up on certiorari in an
upcoming term of court. One thing is for certain though: with an
estimated 12,040 inmates that are expected to benefit from last
November's retroactive guidelines amendment, and an unknown number
of career offenders now potentially barred from receiving the same kind
of reduction, there will be ample opportunity for this issue to continue
to be litigated in the district courts over the next few years. One can
only hope and expect that, at the end of that litigation (and any

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at *1-3.
U.S. SENTENCING GuIDLINEs MANUAL, app. C, vol. III, amend. 759 (2011).
Ware, 2012 WL 38937, at *1.
131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).
Ware, 2012 WL 38937, at *5-7.
Id. at *8-10.
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subsequent appeals), the judicial system will work to ensure that each
defendant will receive whatever sentence is truly fair.
MICHAEL McNEILL

1416

[Vol. 63

MERCER LAW REVIEW

APPENDIX

SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)

Offens
Level

Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
111 (4,
IV (7,8,
V (10,
VI (13 or
I (0 or II (2 or
11. 12)
9)
more)
5 6)
3)
1)
,

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
2-8

0-6
1-7
3-9

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
1-7

0-6
1-7
2-8

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
9-15

6-12
9-15
12-18

0-6
0-6
4-10

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
8-14

8- 14
10-16
12-18

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

6-12
8-14
10-16

8-14
10-16
12-18

10-16
12-18
15-21

15-21
18-24
21-27

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

18-24
21-27
24-30

24-30
27-33
30-37

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

17
18

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

27-33
30-37
33-41

33-41
37-46
41-51

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

19
20
21

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

37-46
41-51
46-57

46-57
51-63
57-71

57-71
63-78
70-87

63-78
70-87
77-96

22
23
24

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

51-63
57-71
63-78

63-78
70-87
77-96

77-96
84-105
92-115

84-105
92-115
100-125

25
26

57-71
63-78

63-78
70-87

70-87
78-97

84-105
92-115

100-125
110-137

110-137
120-150

1

2
3

Zone
A

5
6

7
8

9
Zone B
10
11

Zone

12
13

14
15

16

Zone
D

20121
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70-87

78-97

87-108

100-125

120-150

130-162

28
29

78-97
87-108

87-108
97-121

110-137
121-151

130-162
140-175

140-175
151-188

30

97-121

108-135

97-121
108135
121151

135-168

151-188

168-210

31

108135
121151
135168

121-151

135168
151188
168210

151-188

168-210

188-235

168-210

188-235

210-262

188-235

210-262

235-293

151188
168210
188235

168-210

188235
210262
235293

210-262

235-293

262-327

235-293

262-327

292-365

262-327

292-365

324-405

210262
235293
262327

235-293

262327
292365
324405

292-365

324-405

360-life

324-405

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

292365
324405
360life

324-405

360life
360life
360life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

Life

life

life

life

life

life

32
33

34
35
36

37
38
39

40
41
42

43

135-168
151-188

188-235
210-262

262-327
292-365

360-life
360-life

